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JPRS Report

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19970113116

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SPRINGFIELD, VA 22161

Arms Control

JPRS-TAC-92-030

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8 October 1992

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U.S. Senate Approves Nuclear Test Ban
OW1809224292 Beijing XINHUA in English
2136 GMT 18 Sep 92

[Text] Washington, September 18 (XINHUA)—In major votes affecting the U.S. national security, the U.S. Senate approved today a ban on nuclear testing to take effect in 1996, but backed the Bush administration's new proposal to build a fleet of 20 B-2 "Stealth" bombers for the U.S. Air Force.

The nuclear test ban, the B-2 bomber and the "Star Wars" strategic defense system, on which the Senate acted on Thursday [17 September], were considered probably the three most controversial issues during the congressional debate over a 274.5 billion dollar defense authorization bill for fiscal 1993 beginning October 1.

On a 55-40 vote, the Senate passed an amendment by Sen. Mark Hatfield to the defense bill that would implement an immediate nine-month moratorium on nuclear weapons testing, followed by 15 tests for safety, with no more than five tests a year, and a ban starting in September 1996.

Sen. Hatfield said that continued nuclear testing made little sense in a world rushing to reduce nuclear arsenals and where nuclear tensions had abated with the disappearance of the Soviet Union.

"The American public has told us loud and clear that they want testing to end," despite the Bush administration's contention that it is needed to guarantee the safety and effectiveness of the U.S. arsenal, the senator said.

In other action on the Pentagon bill, the Senate defeated with a 53-45 vote an amendment by Sen. Patrick Leahy to limit the fleet of "Stealth" bombers to 15 instead of 20, saying the planes were an "anachronistic symbol of the cold war."

The U.S. Congress has authorized 15 planes and 16th if it meets certain criteria. The bill would authorize 2.6 billion dollars to build the last four of the bombers.

"Why throw away good money after bad," Sen. Leahy asked. "If our country no longer has a military need for the B-2 we should stop the program now."

As the Senate worked through other issues on the bill late Thursday, supporters of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) won an approval of 3.8 billion dollars for the anti-missile program for the next year.

President Bush is seeking 5.3 billion dollars next year for SDI, and the U.S. House has already approved a 4.3 billion dollar spending level.

The defense bill is expected to pass before the start of next week and differences with a House version remain to be resolved before the measure can be sent to President Bush.

PRC To Boycott Perm-5 Mideast Arms Control Talks

OW2109131692 Beijing XINHUA in English
1300 GMT 21 Sep 92

[Text] Beijing, September 20 (XINHUA)—On September 2, the United States Administration, disregarding strong protests from the Chinese Government, decided to sell 150 F-16 fighters to Taiwan. The Chinese Government finds it difficult to stay in the meeting on arms control of the five permanent member states of the United Nations Security Council, pending a reversal of the erroneous decision by the U.S. side.

On May 29, 1991, U.S. President George Bush proposed consultation among the five permanent member states of the security council on the issue of preventing the proliferation of large-scale destructive arms and transfer of conventional weapons in the Middle East. Since that time, representatives from the five states have held three rounds of talks on this issue.

The documents and agenda of the consultative meeting include not only arms control in the Middle East but also prevention of arms proliferation and transfer across the world.

China, as a permanent member state of the U.N. Security Council, has contributed to the meeting with proposals based on its fundamental position of maintaining peace, security and stability in the region as well as the world.

Because it believes in keeping peace in the Middle East and the world, and in respecting the vital interests of countries and people of that region, China supported the suggestion by Middle East countries to establish a non-large-scale destructive arms zone in the area.

At the same time, China demanded that stability at a lower level be realized under fair, reasonable, all-round and balanced principles.

China has repeatedly stressed that a big state selling large numbers of arms in the Middle East should take real actions to maintain and improve security and stability in the region by limiting its arms sales and respecting the desire of the region's peoples.

However, quite to the contrary, some states, regardless of security and the interests of the Middle East's peoples, lacked sincerity and responsibility in arms transfers. Undue emphasis was placed on the issue of notification of arms transfer among the five states. Although this influenced them to play a larger and more constructive role in arms control, it failed to bring security of any kind to the Middle East.

Some states publicly accused other countries of selling arms, while at the same time stepping up their own arms sales in the region. This revealed the full extent of a double standard on arms control.

As a result of Chinese promotion and persistence, representatives of the five states at the meeting promised to adopt a series of principles as follows: Arms control should be based on fair, reasonable, all round and balanced principles; the international transfer of conventional weapons should aim to improve the legal self-defence of receptive countries, avoiding tension in regional situation or using arms transfer to interfere in the internal affairs of sovereign states.

If the principles agreed to by the five nations were followed, there would have been positive implications. But the reality of the situation is just the opposite of this.

Even before the ink had dried on the document setting out the agreed-upon principles, especially those referring to non-intervention in internal affairs with military sales and not aggravating regional tensions, the United States, one of the five nations, went back on its word through brazenly deciding to sell F-16 fighters to Taiwan, hence brutally intervening in Chinese internal affairs and deliberately creating tensions in the Taiwan Strait area.

The United States failed to keep its word, making the principles a mere scrap of paper and severely undermining the basis of the five-nation conference on arms control. So the aim and principles of the conference have lost their positive meaning and value.

If a country loses its minimum credibility just for the sake of its own self-interest, it cannot but do harm to mutual trust between countries. If an agreement reached yesterday is broken today, will anyone be confident that today's agreement will not be torn up tomorrow? And will it make sense to take part in this kind of conference under such circumstances?

Thus, it is impossible for China to attend the five-nation conference on arms control until the United States alters its decision to sell F-16 fighters to Taiwan. And the United States should bear the responsibility for this.

Foreign Minister Addresses UN General Assembly

*OW2309162992 Beijing XINHUA in English
1605 GMT 23 Sep 92*

[Text] United Nations, September 23 (XINHUA)—China reiterated its call here today for international efforts to undertake disarmament and strongly condemned sales of advanced weapons to interfere in other country's internal affairs.

Addressing the 47th General Assembly of the United Nations, Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen said China "opposes the attempt of a country to interfere in and obstruct the normal cooperation between sovereign states under the pretext of preventing arms proliferation."

"We strongly condemn blatant violation of one's own commitment to an international agreement by selling

large amount of advanced weapons and equipment to grossly interfere in another country's internal affairs," he said.

The foreign minister said China has all long stood for the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of all weapons of mass destruction.

"Pending the realization of this goal, it is necessary for the international community to take, as a transitional step, appropriate measures to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in the interest of regional and world security and stability," he said.

"We maintain that international non-proliferation should be pursued in a fair, reasonable, comprehensive and balanced manner without prejudice to the legitimate security interests of any country and its socio-economic development, or to international cooperation in the application of science and technology for peaceful purposes," Qian stressed.

He said China would like to see that all nuclear weapon states undertake not to be the first to use nuclear weapons or to resort to the threat or use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states under whatever conditions.

He called on all nuclear weapon states to support proposals for the establishment of nuclear-weapon free zones, respect the status of the existing nuclear-weapon free zones and undertake corresponding obligations.

He also proposed that those countries which have deployed nuclear weapons abroad withdraw all of them back to their own territories.

As for countries with space capabilities, the Chinese foreign minister urged them to follow the principle of peaceful use of space, and immediately stop their research, testing, production and deployment of space weapons and refrain from extending their weapon systems into the space.

The United States and the former Soviet Union or Russia have reached some new agreements on nuclear arms reduction in recent years, Qian said, noting that "these agreements are well received by the international community which hopes that they will be earnestly implemented by the countries concerned".

However, he pointed out that it is clear to people that even after the above-said disarmaments are fully implemented, the major military powers will still be in possession of the largest arsenals of most sophisticated nuclear and other high-tech weapons and the capabilities to develop space weapons.

Though some of the provisions in the the chemical weapons convention, which was finally concluded after years of negotiations, "are not fair and balanced, the purposes and objectives defined in the convention have nonetheless won the unanimous endorsement and support of the international community," Qian said.

The foreign minister said China hopes that these purposes and objectives "will be observed and carried out effectively in the interest of the security of all countries."

Russian Troop Withdrawals on Schedule

*OW2409000892 Beijing XINHUA in English
2236 GMT 23 Sep 92*

[Text] Moscow, September 23 (XINHUA)—The withdrawal of Russian troops from former Soviet republics and foreign states is proceeding as scheduled, Boris Gromov, deputy Russian defence minister said here today.

There are over 250,000 Russian troops outside Russia. They are now in Poland, Germany, Mongolia and the three Baltic states, Moldova. And there are about 65,000 pieces of military hardware, 1.8 million tonnes of ammunition outside of Russia, according to ITAR-TASS.

Gromov said a state program calling for the withdrawal of Russian troops from foreign countries is now being discussed in the parliament and the government.

He said the Russian Government will take measures to provide about 56,000 families of Army officers returning home with housing.

To this end, 125 dwelling houses and 33 hostels and barracks will be built in various regions of Russia by the end of the year.

Second U.S. Nuclear Detonation Noted

*OW2409043792 Beijing XINHUA in English
0315 GMT 24 Sep 92*

[Text] Washington, September 23 (XINHUA)—The United States today detonated its second nuclear device after its first one of a 20,000-ton yield nuclear device six days ago.

Jim Boyer, a spokesman for the U.S. Department of Energy, said scientists at the Yucca Flats test site in the Nevada desert detonated a nuclear device that produced an explosion equivalent to 20,000 tons of dynamite.

It was the sixth and last test during this fiscal year, which ends in October.

The device detonated six days ago was designed to ensure the survivability of ceramic products deployed in space, which was followed by a U.S. Senate resolution calling for a nine-month moratorium on nuclear testing.

The Senate measure permits limited testing after the nine-month moratorium and no testing at all after 1996.

U.S. Administration officials have said that they would continue testing for "safety, reliability and survivability" as long as the United States maintains nuclear weapons and that U.S. President George Bush would veto the test-ban legislation.

The former Soviet Union has not detonated a nuclear device since October 1990.

POLAND

Program for Vienna CSCE Disarmament Talks Outlined

LD2209222592 Warsaw PAP in English 2153 GMT 21 Sep 92

[Text] Vienna, Sept. 21—The setting up of the Vienna forum "definitely ends the era of political blocs in disarmament negotiations" as all the CSCE states will attend it enjoying equal rights, said Poland's representative to the conference on the eve of new negotiations on disarmament, control of armaments and confidence and security building measures to start in Vienna on Sept. 22.

Poland wants to ensure itself external conditions for continuing democratic and free market changes, Ambassador Jerzy Nowak stressed. Making its own defensive efforts, Poland has been trying to get closer to NATO and the WEU [Western European Union]

Poland is in the process of achieving reconciliation with its big neighbours without attempts to internationalize mutual problems and is the only state in the region not involved in national or territorial disputes. This is the reason why Poland can play a new role in preventing conflicts and in preserving peace in its foreground. In this context, the Vienna forum will become an auxiliary instrument of strengthening Poland's own security, Nowak explained.

General Makes Report on Russian Troop Withdrawals

AU2309112792 Warsaw SIS in Polish 2033 GMT 21 Sep 92

["Communique by the Government Press Office"]

[Text] General of Brigade Zdzislaw Ostrowski, Polish Government plenipotentiary for Russian Federation forces in Poland, has conveyed to Jan Maria Rokita, head of the Office of the Council of Ministers, a report on the withdrawal of Russian forces from Poland in August.

In August, 24 Russian Federation military operations transports (96 percent of the plan) and 52 supply transports (95 percent of the plan) left Poland.

The following left our country: 945 soldiers; two anti-aircraft guns; 14 armored fighting vehicles; 782 traction, heavy goods, and special vehicles; 356 goods trailers; and about 4,000 tonnes of materiel and equipment.

Russian forces (personnel plus equipment) boarded trains at the following garrisons: Wroclaw Prace, Legnica, Strachow, Szprotawa, Wedrzyn, Kluczewo, and Borne Sulnowo. Road convoys with supplies departed from the following garrisons: Wroclaw, Olawa, Legnica, Modla, Szprotawa, Stargard Szczecinski, Kluczewo, and Borne Sulnowo.

In August the Russians transferred to Polish authorities 804 facilities and 43,976 hectares of land; 190 of these facilities were "in temporary use" by the soldiers, whereas 614 were built using funds of the former Soviet Union.

Poland took over six [number as received] garrisons (Zimna Woda, Strachow, Wedrzyn, Krzywa, and Wschowa); two training areas were handed over in their entirety (Borne Sulnowo and Swietoszow), and one other was handed over partially (Trzebin-Przemkow).

Polish military engineers and chemical experts checked the Wilkocin, Trzebien, and Chojna garrisons, and did not discover any explosive or dangerous materials.

On 1 September there were still about 10,000 men, 63 armored fighting vehicles, three anti-aircraft units, 5,100 vehicles, four airplanes, two helicopters, and 115,000 tonnes of material (including 1,200 tonnes of ammunition) in Poland. Russian Federation forces still occupy 2,300 [number as received] facilities (1,990 of them "in temporary use" and 300 built by the Russians).

Fifty-eight operations transports (95 percent of the plan) and 219 supply transports (79 percent of the plan) transited Poland from Germany on their way to Russia.

One Russian helicopter flying over Poland violated air safety regulations and created a hazard for the crew of a yacht sailing on Orawa Lake. An investigation is underway. No breaches of the peace were noted.

In September, the Russians plan to dispatch to their country 22 operations transports (loaded onto 595 railroad wagons) and 65 supply transports (407 wagons).

IRAN

Atomic Energy Official Calls for Mideast NWFZ

Addresses IAEA General Conference

LD2409213792 Tehran IRNA in English 1601 GMT
22 Sep 92

[Text] Vienna, Sept. 22, IRNA—While initiatives for the prevention of nuclear proliferation as well as enhanced control and verification mechanisms should be applied and enforced without discrimination, they should not impede legitimate and peaceful development programmes, said the vice-president of the Islamic Republic and president of Iran's Atomic Energy Organization (IAEO), Reza Amrollahi.

Amrollahi, who is also President Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani's deputy, was speaking here Tuesday during the general debate at the General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

He said that "in Islam, knowledge and virtue are one and the same thing since knowledge without virtue is meaningless...Knowledge without virtue in the nuclear field would not present any assurances for the well-being of society. The best proof of this, of course, are the tragedies of Hiroshima and Nagasaki".

Amrollahi emphasized that the conference should note and condemn the atrocities perpetrated against European Muslims in Bosnia- Hercegovina.

"The sheer magnitude of the tragedies in the Balkans required urgent and decisive preventive responses from the Security Council as well as the European Community.

"However, not only such responses were not forthcoming but even the human-rights activists and organizations, usually vocal on much more mundane issues remained silent".

Islamic Iran, he continued, fully subscribed to the campaign against the proliferation of the weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, as a noble cause.

"We support this on humanitarian grounds and also for the simple reason that during the recent past Iran has been the only state which suffered the deployment of chemical weapons against its people", he added.

Amrollahi acknowledged the justified concerns about proliferation of such weapons are a direct consequence of misguided policies of certain regimes.

"Let us not forget, however, that also to blame are the industrialized states which knowingly, or unwittingly, assisted the development of 'parallel' programmes in such states. Nevertheless such belated policies, if indeed effective in stemming the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction will have our full support", he remarked.

Iran was the first state to propose the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone (NWFZ) in the Middle East and continues to promote this issue.

Obstacles to the successful implementation of non-proliferation treaty (NPT), the agency full-scope safeguards system and a NWFZ treaty still remain, added Amrollahi.

Nuclear weapons states party to the NPT never completely fulfilled their obligations, be it related to technical support of peaceful nuclear programs in developing states, or on the opposite side of the spectrum, preventing the transfer of nuclear materials and technology to states suspect of aspiring to 'parallel' programmes.

The head of Iran's Atomic Energy Organization (IAEO) noted that neither pressure nor any form of sanctions were brought to bear against states with well-known 'parallel' nuclear programmes to accede to the NPT. There have also been cases where regimes with well-known and entirely non-peaceful nuclear programs were allowed to proceed unimpeded.

"In this context, well-researched and authoritative documents, based on credible sources, are available which describe how Israel developed its nuclear weapons with full knowledge and tacit approval of some, if not all, of the nuclear-weapon states", he pointed out.

He said states not party to the NPT never felt obliged to accept the agency's full-scope safeguards regime but in some cases agreed to voluntary-type safeguards agreements which only served to burden the already strained IAEA budget.

Amrollahi observed: "Ironically Israel and other states not party to the NPT and thus beyond the verification mandate of the agency, were allowed to remain IAEA members and even benefit from its technical assistance.

"Indeed how could one reasonably expect various regions become free of nuclear weapons when states within those regions have already acquired nuclear weapons clandestinely and persistently refuse to forfeit that option.

"Regrettably the NPT depositories neglected to prevent the clandestine acquisition of nuclear weapons on regional bases. Whether this has been a pure political negligence or some sort of favouritism the fact remains that it has provided incentive for the neighbouring states to seek parity".

The Israeli regime has for years arrogantly defied nuclear control and verification while a number of states including those in the Middle East have recently sought adherence to the instruments of nuclear control and verification.

Amrollahi said: "This trend has made the position of Israel, vis-a-vis the proliferation issue, much more isolated and its negative stance, in the face of present trends, even more unacceptable and inexplicable.

"In seeking a way out of this isolation the Zionist-dominated news media and institutions, as well officials of the Israeli regime have embarked on a propaganda campaign, highlighting the weaponization programs of certain Middle East states including the Islamic Republic of Iran".

He referred to the statement made by an Israeli official in June "whereby he predicts with amazing foresight that Iran would within ten years develop nuclear weapons. He then justifies military action on the strength of such absurd deductions".

The vice-president added that the agency circulated Iran's response to the blatant Israeli threat.

The IAEA mission to Iran in February and the subsequent agency reports proved that the Islamic Republic's nuclear programmes contrary to adverse publicity are entirely peaceful.

"We invited the agency mission to visit Iran under our own initiative and the invitation remains open since we do not intend to hide anything. Such openness and transparency should be reciprocated by support in implementing peaceful programmes not by the imposition of more stringent restrictions", he noted.

Referring to the Bushehr nuclear power plant which the German Government refused to provide the export licences for the completion of the plant, Amrollahi said that billions of dollars has been invested while the cost of its maintenance is an ongoing financial burden.

Restrictions were imposed in spite of the award of the ICC [International Chamber of Commerce] which compels the supplier to complete the plant or hand over outstanding components and documents to Iran.

The Iranian official said: "We believe that given the adverse environmental consequences of utilizing fossil fuels, hydro and nuclear energies are the only practicable alternative for generating electric power on a large scale.

"The developing states, having accepted all the required control and verification mechanisms should therefore not be deprived from this option through unfair and arbitrary restrictions".

Amrollahi announced that cooperation agreements were recently signed between Iran and China, and also with the Russian Federation, within the framework of international rules and standards including IAEA safeguards.

Issue Connected to Reactor Purchases

LD2409180692 Tehran IRNA in English 1630 GMT
23 Sep 92

[Text] Vienna, Sept. 23, IRNA—Vice President of the Islamic Republic and President of Iran's Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (IAEO) Reza Amrollahi told IRNA Wednesday that the Director General of the Vienna-based International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Hans

Blix had expressed optimism that a nuclear-weapon-free zone (NWFZ) could be realised within the next two years.

Earlier Amrollahi at a press briefing said that the four nuclear power plants Iran intends to purchase from the Russian Federation and People's Republic of China have a capacity of less than one unit of the partly completed Bushehr nuclear power plant.

He said that last month a general agreement was signed in Tehran between the Islamic Republic and the Russian Federation for the construction and operation of two VVER-440-213 [water cooled, water-moderated reactor] type nuclear power plant units in Iran.

He also referred to negotiations with the People's Republic of China for the purchase of two 300 megawatt Westinghouse-type reactors designed and manufactured mostly by the Chinese. A general agreement was signed with Chinese side when Amrollahi visited China recently.

However, no contracts have been signed with either the Russian Federation or China. "We have had the opportunity for commercial contacts—they were in the negotiations stage," Amrollahi said.

"We believe in full-scope safeguards and we try to be very open and transparent, as we should".

He pointed out that Iran lacked diverse energy resources apart from oil and gas. It did not have sufficient water resources for hydro-electric generation. "At the moment the best use of gas is for heating purposes in towns and districts since it is clean and we would prefer to save it for the cities and some for export".

There were power shortages, and there is need for additional electrical generating capacity for factories. Iran's objective is to have nuclear power plants for electricity and for desalination plants.

Commenting on the Bushehr project Amrollahi said "that the court of arbitration had already decided that the Germans should complete the work and in case we decided not to give them the contract they are obliged to provide blueprints and equipment to any other contractor we decide".

Regarding applying the ruling, talks had taken place but there are "some difficulties" he acknowledged. He added "we hope to solve this problem in the future".

The vendors claim that they are unable to obtain export licences for completion of the Bushehr nuclear power plant while the German government speaks of "difficulties".

Answering a question of the risk that Iran would be exposed to if the Bushehr project were completed Amrollahi referred to the first nuclear bomb strikes on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. "If they did something wrong it does not mean that everyone should quit".

The Israelis bombed the Iraqi nuclear plant at Tammuz regardless of the [word indistinct] and safeguards. "I think they are violent...If the Iraqis did exactly the same, it does not mean everybody should quit. It's the same for the Germans because they have also nuclear power plants...It can happen to them, to any other party".

Amrollahi suggested a nuclear-weapon-free zone as the answer. Iran supported a NWFZ in the Middle East, he added.

ISRAEL

Series of Arrow Antimissile Missile Tests Completed

Final Test Termed 'Successful'

TA2309154792 Tel Aviv IDF Radio in Hebrew
1500 GMT 23 Sep 92

[Text] A successful flight test of the Arrow antimissile missile was conducted this afternoon at a test field in Israel. Military sources had expressed the belief that the continuation of the joint U.S.-Israeli project would depend on the success of this experiment, following the previous three failures. Here is 'Ido Baum with the details:

[Baum] The Arrow missile, the Israeli missile against ballistic missiles, was launched this afternoon within the framework of the fourth trial in a series of four planned tests. Initial data indicates that the missile performed as planned and attained the goals of the trial which were: verification of the functioning of the control systems and the operability of the sensor device the missile is carrying which guides it to its target. No attempt was made to intercept a target in this test.

The three previous tests—in August 1990, and in March and October 1991—did not attain their goals, but provided information for further research. Security sources have said that this information will allow the Israeli Government to make a decision regarding the stationing of antiballistic missile defense systems in Israel. The Arrow missile was developed by the Israel Aircraft

Industry, based on a contract with the U.S. SDI Administration, and financed jointly by Israel and the United States.

Military sources recently said that the continuation of the project depends, to a large extent, on the success of this latest test. The defense establishment reported today that work for the development of the missile will continue within a framework that will be called the project for the continuation of the Arrow missile development—ACES [acronym given in English]. The plan will continue with the same financing and team.

Details Reported

TA2309203792 Jerusalem Qol Yisra'el in Hebrew
1705 GMT 23 Sep 92

[Report by Army affairs correspondent Karmela Menashe]

[Excerpt] The Arrow missile was launched from a test field in Israel at 1421 [1221 GMT]; the flight lasted some 42 seconds. Initial data indicates that the missile behaved as planned and attained its goals. During the flight, it entered its trajectory and conducted maneuvers as planned. All of the missile's systems including the sensory device which guides the Arrow to its target, the control systems, the computer, and the engine operated perfectly. At the end of the flight, the missile destroyed itself as planned. No attempt was made to intercept a target in this test. [passage omitted]

Chemical Arms Charter To Be Signed 'End of 1992'

TA2309205492 Jerusalem GOVERNMENT PRESS
OFFICE in English 1520 GMT 23 Sep 92

[Communicated by the Cabinet Secretariat]

The ministerial committee for national security convened this morning, (Wednesday), 23.9.92, in Jerusalem, to discuss Israeli participation in the Chemical Weapons Charter. It was decided to accept the recommendation to sign the charter. The signing is to take place at the end of 1992.

Joining the group of the first countries to sign marks the continuation of government policy to advance the peace process.

GENERAL

Visit to Chelyabinsk-70 Weapons Lab Described

92WC0061A Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English
No 32, 9-16 Aug 92 p 8

[Article by Dmitry Yakushkin, MOSCOW NEWS correspondent: "Far From Moscow"]

[Text] Symbolic images still weigh heavily on one's mind on the road from Yekaterinburg to Chelyabinsk.

There is an unmarked turn from the main highway delineated neither by a monument to Kurchatov nor by a sculptural structure dedicated to peaceful nuclear themes. Then there is a big village where the church closest to the nuclear centre is being brought back to life with money from the military budget.

Then there is "Picture Number One" without which this city would lose (at any rate for outsiders) its prestige. It is a checkpoint with all of its cinema-like attributes—a ploughed strip, barbed wire and, in all probability, some other kind of sophisticated security system. There are guards along the entire perimeter—across the forest, fields and even on the lake on which shore the generals have chosen the site for numerically designated Chelyabinsk.

There is another important landmark. The section of the road beyond the checkpoint which is already in the zone and leads to houses, has been informally nicknamed by local people as Baker Street because the United States Secretary of State James Baker came on an inspection tour of this area last January.

Chelyabinsk-70 is a treasure trove for generalizations of any order and degree of complexity. It has a population of 45,000, 16,000 of whom work at a closed institute.

Of all impressions from Chelyabinsk-70, the strongest is its peacefulness. Maybe this is only in contrast with the somewhat mad Moscow. Or perhaps it's simply pleasant to bump into scenes from the past which seem as attractive as a documentary of the 1960s. Local mothers still leave carriages with children at the doors of shops. It is said that half of the city's population leaves the keys under the door mats.

There are many cars—almost one for every three inhabitants like in Los Angeles. This gives the city air of a fully-flourishing research centre.

The buses are free, not because there is communism, but because the officials calculated it would be cheaper not to have to pay cashiers and controllers.

A Leningrad architect planned this city (according to our understated standards, it is true) in a surprisingly competent manner. In general, the city seems to have come from a picture in a book of the past. There are five-story warm yellow houses coming down in terraces to the lake resembling the first postwar series. The main square, where a monument to Lenin stands, is the spot around

which everything is built. All that is missing is a plane flying in the sky, but flights over this city are forbidden.

Such is the scene. Now imagine waking up in the morning to the heart-rending wail of a siren. This is practice alarm. It has evidently been invented in case, God forbid, such a thing happens sometime for whatever reason—be it an attack from the air or a local accident. And now, from the height of a hotel window, you look down at the square and the city, overwhelmed by the wailing siren, and observe that nothing out of the ordinary is happening; children are going to their first lessons at school and women buying yogurt at the food store in the square.

In Chelyabinsk-70, there are production areas with varying degrees of secrecy. This is an argument for keeping the city closed, because if opened, it would be necessary to put up separate guards around each facility. After restrictions on inviting relatives have been lifted, the majority of townspeople are in favour of keeping the closed status.

The flow of visitors, including both natives and foreigners to Chelyabinsk, has grown so there was a need to open more places for visitors. Yet it's hard to get rid of the feeling that you are constantly being watched. Greater attention is paid to any stranger here—not necessarily for all-pervasive state security considerations—but simply because strangers stand out in a provincial town where everyone knows each other. When meeting with journalists, local people seem to have learned to expect mostly reproaches, accusations and the distortion of their words and, in the interest of self-preservation, keep their distance.

From the standpoint of design, the technology of the equipment being used (at least what I was permitted to see) seemed bulky but by no means modern. It doesn't make one want to exclaim: the "leading edge of science" is located here.

Chelyabinsk-70 has undergone a conversion process to produce everyday commercial products. One of Russia's nuclear facilities has been modified to assist the Chelyabinsk poultry plant. In one of the workshops where there are no nuclear test units, there are several little tables with chutes to conveyer belts. Along it roll hen's eggs which are weighed, marked and distributed according to category.

With such sophisticated technology and immense brain power, one may assume that the poultry facility is the lowest point in the range of possibilities. Of course, Chelyabinsk-70 was initially conceived as a closed society with specialists with cum laudis diplomas in every profession. Such a community can probably accomplish quite a lot. For example, one of the experiments, on which great hopes are pinned, is the so-called fiber-optical means of communication. For many years,

the West has used COCOM to forbid the sale to the USSR means of producing communication lines with high-speed transmission.

Therefore, Chelyabinsk-70 has been mastering its own technology. Beginning next year, the system is going to be used in the city, and in 1994 in Novokuznetsk, which today is not even connected to the inter-city phone network. The outcome should be great. But in no way is it related to nuclear development. The new work, it seems, will bring employees much higher earnings. The conversion process is modernizing the institute.

The wages are now ridiculous. And beyond the city—and even inside it—there are more lucrative possibilities for employment.

It is important to remember, nuclear weapons have not yet been altogether cancelled. In Chelyabinsk-70 it is expected that a nuclear doctrine for the future will be formulated—this will make the situation more or less clear. The weapons which have already been created either require attention or should be dismantled by those who once developed and conceived them. There is also a need to somehow utilize the uranium and plutonium being released—a job which should be entrusted to the nuclear centre.

Having in recent years heard of Lawrence Livermore and Los Alamos—similar American laboratories with a broad range of orders—the nuclear scientists of Chelyabinsk-70 hope that weapon making will in their case comprise a third of the volume of all work.

Most of the scientists came to Chelyabinsk-70 at the end of the 1950s. The new arrivals were burning with a desire to show up the first centre—Arzamas-16—where the venerable “old folks,” Khariton, Zeldovich and Sakharov, had been left behind. It so happened that youth, fashion for physics in society, and the state's attention to nuclear programme all blended for the Chelyabinsk new settlers. Secrecy, strange as it may seem, did not prevent them from living an open and cheerful life.

Possibly, that was the last generation of the technical intelligentsia which made no distinction between its own interests and those of the state.

Today, as this group of people, comprising the backbone of the nuclear centre, is approaching the pension age, there is a need for fresh blood and at least the same clan as existed in the case of “men and women of the 1960s” to keep up with American-style technology.

In my talks with the keepers of state secrets, I felt a fairly wary attitude towards Americans. And this, despite the boom in professional contacts with the West. Perhaps this mistrust amounts to frustration and lack of clarity in respect to their own future. Without any bitter feelings towards Americans it is being calmly and soberly stated here: America does not objectively need a strong nuclear centre in Russia. By snatching individual scientists out

of it, offering them jobs on single contracts, it will be possible quietly to pull the centre asunder. There is also a fairly widespread view that the Americans show us less than what we show them. Or else they just show old junk.

Yevgeny Avronin, scientific director of the centre, said, “We definitely open up more, for Americans than they do for us, but they pay money for this. For money, we have given and will be giving our breakthroughs in science and technology. It's a different matter since this should do no harm to Russia. But today Russia is not in a position to maintain such a number of scientists or to support science on such a scale.”

The most basic question left to answer is will they leave or won't they leave? Among nuclear scientists, leaving would be thought of as irresponsible and unpatriotic. Therefore, most will stay for the time being although proposals keep coming. At a recent scientific conference in the USA, nuclear scientists from Chelyabinsk-70 were offered to work for a salary of 1,000 dollars a month. In America, as everyone knows, such a pay would be seen as insulting.

U.S.-Belarusian Talks on Nuclear Arms Destruction

LD2909095192 Moscow Programme Radio Odin Network in Russian 0830 GMT 29 Sep 92

[Text] Talks between Belarus and the United States on the destruction of nuclear weapons have begun in Minsk. On the agenda are a discussion of clean-up operations after nuclear accidents, a communications system linking the Belarus national supervisory and inspection agency with the American national center for reducing nuclear danger, and expert supervision of imports and exports of strategic components for weapons of mass destruction.

Second Plutonium Reactor Closed in Krasnoyarsk

LD2909200492 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0639 GMT 29 Sep 92

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Yuriy Khots]

[Text] Krasnoyarsk September 29 TASS—Another nuclear reactor producing plutonium for military purposes was shut down at Krasnoyarsk nuclear enterprise on Tuesday [29 September].

The first reactor of the type was closed down this summer.

Both underground installations have been working in Krasnoyarsk for thirty years causing considerable pollution of the major Siberian Yenisei river in which they discharged radioactive water from the cooling systems.

Fifty years will be necessary to completely bury the reactors. Scientists will have to monitor them for years.

The Krasnoyarsk enterprise is now planning to produce small reactors which can generate heat and electricity in remote northern areas of Russia.

Shaposhnikov on Commonwealth Collective Security

*PM2909213992 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 30 Sep 92 pp 2-3*

["Topical Theme" article by Marshal of Aviation Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov: "National and Collective Security in the CIS"]

[Excerpts] The beginning of November will see a scientific-practical conference at the Joint Armed Forces High Command on problems of national and collective security in the CIS. As a kind of prologue to the discussion of topical defense questions at the conference, we are offering an article by Marshal of Aviation Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov, commander in chief of the CIS Joint Armed Forces.

The urgency of the solution of tasks of ensuring military stability for every state and for the international community is conditioned by the military political situation that obtains in the world. It has a dual influence on security in present-day conditions.

On the one hand, the end of the cold war and the move from confrontation to cooperation and integration processes in Europe and in the Far East create fundamentally new conditions for ensuring national and international security.

On the other hand, the elimination of the bipolar geopolitical structure of the world has caused a rash of regional and local military political contradictions and has led to significant changes in the system of international relations and the appearance of new "risk factors" and military conflicts as a result of this.

This process is aggravated by the fact that the arms race is not over yet and the sale of weapons is still based on the factor of economic and military gain. There is still the possibility of disruptive destabilization due to the creation of new types of weapons and there is still the danger of the proliferation of nuclear weapons, missiles, and missile technology.

As a result the tendency to use the strong arm approach to the solution of international problems is not a thing of the past. Moreover, it is beginning to get its second wind.

This, in turn, is due, in my view, to a number of circumstances of worldwide significance, above all to efforts by the leading Western countries to redesign the bipolar world into a unipolar military political space.

But the unipolar world, to my mind, is not viable, particularly from the military strategic viewpoint. It cannot exist for long. Neither in nature nor in society are there processes or phenomena with a single-pole charge,

even if that pole is unequivocally positive. Counterweights will inevitably appear to balance and stabilize the situation. This is confirmed by the presence of such organizations as the United Nations, NATO, the CSCE, and the Western European Union. [passage omitted]

The most burning problem, which is causing particular alarm in the world community, is connected with the CIS states discharging in accordance with international treaties the USSR's obligations in the area of reducing both nuclear and conventional arms.

There is progress in the area of conventional arms. This May the Tashkent Agreement "On the Principles and Procedure for Implementing the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe" was concluded, in accordance with which each CIS state has quotas for maximum levels of conventional weapons and equipment.

The problem of reducing nuclear weapons is being resolved. It is in this very area that the Commonwealth states' leaders showed most consideration and responsibility. As a result, tactical nuclear weapons were withdrawn from the territory of all the states and concentrated in Russian storage bases in May of this year.

As regards strategic nuclear weapons, they are deployed and will continue to be deployed for some time yet [yeshche nekotorye vremya] on the territories of four states—Russia (80 percent), Ukraine (10 percent), Kazakhstan (6 percent), and Belarus (4 percent). They are under a single control and command. All states except Russia (in accordance with the agreement), have confirmed their status as nonnuclear powers and have acceded to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. At the same time, it is my view that the longer they are situated on the four states' territories, the more complex it will be to carry out both the ratification and implementation of this document and the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Arms. Strategic nuclear weapons should have their own "statehood" not only in the future but already in the present, despite the fact they are situated on the territories of various Commonwealth states. In accordance with all the documents which have been adopted, this "statehood" should be Russian.

At the present time the High Command is doing everything to bring the positions of the Commonwealth states as close as possible to one another in this important question. The Belarusian and Russian positions are closest of all and accord with the demands of the adopted agreements. Kazakhstan's point of view is drawing near to this joint position. Ukraine occupies a somewhat different position. There are now intensive negotiations in progress on coordinating and bringing closer together all the points of view.

One of the important constituents of collective security in the CIS is the maintenance of peace and stability within the Commonwealth. To this end, the heads of the states signed an agreement on groups of military observers and collective forces for maintaining peace in the CIS, as well as a number of protocols defining their

status, a procedure for manpower acquisition, and for the provision and use of materials and equipment.

The most important tenet of these documents is that the groups of observers and the collective peacemaking forces will be multinational. This cuts out speculation around the Russian, Slavic, or, on the other hand, Turkic factor in the peacemaking process and permits them to carry out the tasks before them more effectively.

In this way, taking the obvious contradictions that exist in the Commonwealth into account, there is a pressing need for a more considered, serious, and coordinated approach to resolving questions of organizational development in defense. In this very area, albeit a fragile but very important trend has been taking shape recently, which I would call a trend toward integration, as it designates a move away from disunification to unification, to consolidation, and a joint search for effective ways of guaranteeing military security. I am sure that a constructive approach to these problems will make it possible to ensure peace and stability in the Commonwealth of Independent States, Europe, and throughout the world, and will serve the interests of all countries' national and collective security.

STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTIONS

Strategic Rocket Forces Chief on Army Issues

PM2309155792 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 23 Sep 92 p 2

[Interview with Colonel General Igor Sergeyev, commander in chief of Strategic Rocket Forces, by Aleksandr Dolinin under the "First Interview in New Post" rubric; place and date not given: "Rocket Forces Have a History, and They Have a Future"—first two paragraphs are introduction "from KRASNAYA ZVEZDA's file"]

[Text] Colonel General Igor Dmitriyevich Sergeyev was born 20 April 1938 in the city of Verkhniy in Voroshilovgrad Oblast. He graduated from the P.S. Nakhimov Black Sea Higher Naval School and, with distinction, from the command faculty of the F.E. Dzerzhinskiy Military Engineering Academy and the General Staff Military Academy. He has spent more than 30 years in the Rocket Forces. He has held various engineer, command, and staff posts. He has been commander in chief of the Strategic Rocket Forces since 1 September 1992. Before this he was deputy commander in chief of the Strategic Rocket Forces for combat training.

He is married. His son is a student at Moscow Road Transport Institute.

[Dolinin] Igor Dmitriyevich, you are the seventh commander in chief in the history of the Strategic Rocket Forces, and your entire service has been connected with missiles, and yet you graduated from a naval school...

[Sergeyev] I entered the naval school of my own volition, under the influence of seamen who were in the Sergeyev

family. But circumstances necessitated a change in the nature of service. This was the time of the creation of the Strategic Rocket Forces, which were being formed on the basis of all branches of the Armed Forces. The rocket units were joined by seamen, airmen, artillerymen...

[Dolinin] You mentioned the Sergeyev family...

[Sergeyev] It is ordinary, not distinguished. My father worked in a mine from the age of 11 years. He participated in the Great Patriotic War and then took part in rehabilitating the Donbass. My mother raised her children. Everything in the family was aimed at giving the children a higher education. I, the elder son, became a military man, while the younger one became a professor and a doctor of medical sciences.

[Dolinin] You were appointed to the post by a decree of the Russian Federation president. What is the status of the Rocket Forces today?

[Sergeyev] The agreement signed and approved by the Commonwealth heads of state says everything about the purpose and status of the Strategic Rocket Forces, which form part of the Strategic Forces. It is within the framework of this legal document that the Strategic Rocket Forces arrange their activity. In accordance with the decree of the Russian Federation president, they have been made operationally subordinate to the Commonwealth Joint Armed Forces High Command.

Direct leadership of the forces is entrusted to the commander in chief of the Strategic Rocket Forces, who is subordinate to the Russian Federation defense minister and bears personal responsibility for the state of the Rocket Troops, their combat readiness, their all-around training, the leadership of combat duty, the guaranteed ensuring of nuclear safety...

[Dolinin] The Rocket Forces remain on combat duty. This is natural. But in connection with the Russian president's well-known statement readers ask this question: Against what are the missiles targeted?

[Sergeyev] The question of the selection of targets is a matter for big-time politics. The task of strategic rocket troops, as you rightly noted, is to perform combat duty to the prescribed degrees of combat readiness. Thereby we ensure the fulfillment of the tasks set for us by the top leadership of the country and the Armed Forces.

It is obvious that the retargeting of missiles cannot be a unilateral act if it is a question of collective security.

[Dolinin] Igor Dmitriyevich, let us touch on such an acute question as cooperation among Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus with regard to the Strategic Rocket Forces.

[Sergeyev] Many problems here have been resolved by a number of agreements concluded by the Commonwealth member states. But questions do exist. The chief one

today is the composition of the Strategic Forces, including the Strategic Rocket Forces, and the procedure for managing them.

All the problems that arise here require serious elaboration and the existence of mutually acceptable conditions for resolving them, ruling out mere expediency.

In general, it is necessary to proceed from the chief point: The Strategic Rocket Forces are an integral organism, not separate launchers. They are all organically linked by a unified leadership, by a centralized system of combat command and control and operation of nuclear missile weapons, and by a unified system of combat duty at all levels of command and control through to the launcher, inclusive. All this is linked by flexible feedback. If this is not taken into account, then the matter of ensuring the Commonwealth states' security will only lose out. No one would forgive us for that.

[Dolinin] Security is also ensured by the high reliability of the nuclear missile weapons that remain in the arsenal. But many enterprises in the military-industrial complex are coming to a halt, and their ties are being broken. Will the Strategic Rocket Forces possess modern weapons in the future?

[Sergeyev] There is a basis for your question. But, in my view, there are ways to resolve it, even taking into account the harm done by dividing up the former Union. Modern combat missile complexes have high-quality characteristics. Chief among them are high combat readiness, mobility, survivability, and the ability to overcome ABM systems and to hit targets with any degree of protection. In taking particular ones off duty, new ones are being modernized and are not inferior to the previous ones in terms of combat characteristics.

[Dolinin] Recently the press has occasionally carried sensational reports of nuclear munitions being stolen and sold. How is nuclear security ensured among the troops? Has the unsanctioned use of weapons been ruled out?

[Sergeyev] There have been no instances of nuclear munitions having been sold during the 33 years that the Strategic Rocket Forces have existed. Rumors to that effect can only be called provocative. For questions of nuclear security and of preventing unsanctioned actions have always been at the center of attention in our troops. The necessary measures were envisaged the day they came into being, and considerable appropriations were invested.

Only highly-trained specialists are admitted to nuclear missile weapons, and the circle of people conversant with the holy of holies is strictly limited. Means of defending and guarding nuclear installations have been comprehensively worked out by science and tested by many years' practice, and world experience has also been taken into account. So the danger of nuclear weapons being used by mistake or deliberately by criminals is ruled out.

[Dolinin] And yet, Igor Dmitriyevich, it is men with their own moods, fatigue, and problems who stand beside this hardware. For, after all, they are alive, and fate does not particularly pamper them, as is the case with us all...

[Sergeyev] All this is so, but the actions of specialists in the Rocket Forces, particularly in dangerous and crucial operations, are subject to triple control. In addition, as I have already said, automatic equipment will not permit liberties. As regards social tension among personnel of the Rocket Forces, of course it exists. For we do not live in a vacuum. Thousands of officers and ensigns, even among those on combat duty, do not have housing, and some have been waiting two or three years for an apartment. Being on combat duty for an average of 18 days a month and not having a corner where they could rest after duty, of course they are not overjoyed. If you consider that many of their wives cannot find work, that there is nowhere to accommodate children because preschool establishments are overly full, and that pay is not keeping up with prices, although it has been increasing recently, then the fact that many are dissatisfied with living conditions is quite understandable. You meet with officers and ensigns, and you feel that not all are confident about the future.

I would like to take this opportunity to express the general opinion of missilemen: A law on the status of servicemen and on social guarantees for them must be adopted as quickly as possible. Its draft has received universal approval among the troops. People are waiting for the deputies to adopt it.

...And yet, despite all the difficulties, we must be optimists. There must be an optimistic principle in our service and life. In general, I believe in the rebirth of Russia and the successful development of its Armed Forces. The threat of a world nuclear missile war and of a large-scale military conflict has been virtually reduced to a minimum today. At the same time it must not be forgotten that the threat of war has not ceased to be a reality. Consequently, the role of the Strategic Rocket Forces, which possess the means of ensuring global stability, still remains as before.

[Dolinin] Igor Dmitriyevich, you are a very critical and, at the same time, benevolent reader of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA...

[Sergeyev] Yes, I subscribe to and read the newspaper. I pin great hopes on it: Since the missilemen do not have their own press, I would like KRASNAYA ZVEZDA to become their own cherished publication.

Scientist Urges Retention of Launch-on-Warning Strategy

LD2509113392 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 2216 GMT 23 Sep 92

[Text] Moscow, 24 Sep (ITAR-TASS)—Academician Vladislav Repin of the Russian Academy has fierce

objections to recent theories regarding possible—even desirable—qualitative changes to Russia's nuclear missile deterrence concept and structure. Until 1988 Vladislav Repin was general designer of the program developing the missile early warning and space monitoring system.

In his words, "we are talking about a proposal ostentatiously and in practice to exclude from Russia's defense policy the concept of the retaliatory-counterstroke strike launched on discovery of a missile attack and leaving as the sole option for retaliation a counter-strike following a hit by the enemy's missiles and elucidation of the damage done."

Adopting a counter-strike option only, Repin believes, is tantamount in its military consequences to adopting the concept of unilateral nuclear missile disarmament. Adopting that position for economic reasons is the worst option for implementation of this concept. "For ailing and impecunious Russia, virtually stripped of combat-ready conventional armed forces and unable to even carry out the evacuation of the embassy in Kabul without losses, it is utterly wasteful to blindly follow the old declaration of non-first use of nuclear weapons and would probably be more advisable to follow the U.S., French, or British examples, which have never undertaken such worthless obligations enabling the latter two countries, which have relatively few nuclear and conventional armed forces, to have great potential for deterrence," Repin concludes.

Belarus Orders Accelerated Strategic Arms Removals

OW2409195592 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1557 GMT 24 Sep 92

[Report prepared by Andrey Pershin, Andrey Petrovskiy, and Vladimir Shishlin; edited by Boris Grishchenko; from the "Presidential Bulletin" feature—following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Stanislav Shushkevich, chairman of the Belarusian National Security Council and head of the parliament, has given instructions to devise a way to remove nuclear missiles from the republic "as soon as possible".

IF [INTERFAX] Note: In accordance with the Lisbon protocol to the treaty on cuts in offensive weapons, strategic nuclear arms should be withdrawn from Belarus within 7 years.

As IF's correspondent learned from government sources, under instructions from Shushkevich experts are working on 4 scenarios for withdrawing 81 mobile missile complexes deployed in Belarus to be carried out within 2, 3, 4 or 5 years (separate calculations are made for every version).

According to experts, the removal of the supermodern solid-fuel intercontinental ballistic missiles and other weapons to Russia and financial difficulties connected

with it is not the main problem. They believe that the worst problem is to provide employment for the personnel of three divisions of strategic missile forces and for three regiments of strategic aircraft stationed in Belarus. It is believed that most officers and petty officers from these units have no intention of leaving Belarus where they have housing.

Kozyrev, Eagleburger Discuss Further Disarmament

LD2609174492 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
1005 GMT 25 Sep 92

[Text] New York September 25 TASS—Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev had a meeting here on Thursday [24 September] with U.S. Acting Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger. They discussed mostly the problems dealing with a further reduction of strategic offensive armaments.

The main parameters of those reductions are recorded in the framework agreement, signed by the Russian and U.S. presidents last June. Now Kozyrev and Eagleburger discussed the treaties to be concluded on its basis. According to representatives of the Russian delegation, the two sides agreed that the Russian-American draft treaty on further reductions of strategic offensive armaments would be worked out on a political level. Eagleburger told journalists immediately after the talks that he and Kozyrev would continue this work in the near future, although he could not give them the date and place of their next meeting.

According to Eagleburger, they discussed a lot of other problems, aside from the reduction of strategic offensive armaments, specifically, the Yugoslav problem and the situation in that country, as well as the situation in the hotbeds of tension on the territory of the new Commonwealth. We discussed the Baltic states, touching upon the military presence there and Russia's concern over the observance of rights of the Russian-speaking minority there, he said.

Tartu Heavy Bomber Command Moved To Novgorod

LD2709111392 Moscow Russian Television Network
in Russian 1900 GMT 25 Sep 92

[Report by N. Poboshchenko; from the "Vesti" newscast]

[Excerpt] The command of the Tartu heavy-bomber division, which not so long ago was headed by General Dudayev, has moved. Henceforth it will be located in the town of Soltsy, in the Novgorod area. This is part of the withdrawal of Russian armed forces from the Baltic countries. The regiment—which bears the Berlin Order of Kutuzov and Aleksandr Nevskiy—has been switched from Tartu to the Far East. However, only the regimental colors, stamp, and a few pilots have actually gone there. Most of the airmen have been posted to other units or

have quit the army altogether. The already difficult living conditions in a Soviet garrison have got yet worse. There are 312 families of officers and NCOs without any housing at all. Supplies of fuel and spare parts for equipment have not just been cut back but often dry up. [passage omitted]

Shaposhnikov: Strategic Missiles Not Yet Retargeted

*OW2609195892 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1912 GMT 26 Sep 92*

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Marshal Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov, the commander-in-chief of the Unified Forces of the CIS, told an INTERFAX correspondent on Saturday [26 September] that the nuclear missiles of the CIS had not yet been retargeted. Although the Russian president had made a statement on this subject, he noted that "a certain period of time will pass before this can be accomplished." According to Marshal Shaposhnikov, the retargeting of the missiles is a technologically complicated process. Furthermore, the members of the CIS have not yet signed a treaty on strategic nuclear missiles. Shaposhnikov called attention to the fact that the nuclear missiles of the United States had not yet been retargeted. In addition, the U.S. has not yet said that it is ready to retarget its missiles.

SDI, DEFENSE & SPACE ARMS

Prospects for U.S.-Russian ABM Cooperation

*924P0178A Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I
MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian
No 8, Aug 92 [signed to press 12 Jul 92] pp 5-17*

[Article by Viktor Igorevich Moskvina, political scientist and international affairs commentator, and Sergey Konstantinovich Oznobishchev, candidate of historical sciences, head of a department of the Russian Academy of Sciences United States and Canada Institute, and deputy director of the Foreign Policy Association Center for Disarmament and Strategic Stability: "Russia and the United States: Is Military-Space Cooperation Practicable?"]

[Text] In recent months problems of compliance with the Anti-Ballistic Missile [ABM] Treaty, the limitation of antimissile defense systems, and the prevention of an arms race in space have once again, following a long interval, come to occupy a priority position in the debate being conducted in the country on questions of security and the reference points of military organizational development and a strengthening of strategic stability. This was given a boost by the statements made by B.N. Yeltsin, president of the Russian Federation, at the start of the year, his speech in the UN Security Council included. Discussions of various levels have broached

key aspects of Russia's security and its defense capability. It is significant that the question of whether cooperation with the United States in military-space systems which has been projected might not open a new channel of the arms race—in outer space—has been raised unambiguously in the course of the debate.

It may be affirmed that as of the present a quite representative community of supporters of compliance with the ABM Treaty as the cornerstone of a strengthening of strategic stability and prevention of an arms race has taken shape in Russia. It unites representatives of political, military, scientific, and industrial circles. The Soviet-American document imposes, as is well known, strict limitations on the possibilities of the creation, testing, and deployment of sea- and air-launched and space- and mobile-ground-based ABM systems or components. Such limitations are an essential factor in the business of curbing a strategic offensive arms race.

Debate Surrounding ABM Defenses

The basic propositions of the ideology professed by this group were elaborated in the course of the campaign which was conducted actively in the 1980's to counteract Reagan's SDI program. It has for fairness' sake to be noted that in this period representatives of the Soviet side operated from positions diametrically opposite to those which representatives of the USSR occupied at the time the ABM Treaty was being developed. At that time, at the start of the 1970's, the USSR upheld the right to create antimissile defense systems and components as a promising direction of assurance of the country's security. Antimissile defenses are, as Soviet Premier A.N. Kosygin declared in 1967, by no means a cause of the arms race but serve as a factor of the prevention of people's destruction.¹

It took great efforts from the American side—in the process of an active dialogue on problems of disarmament and limitation of the arms race (in the course of which the basic propositions of the concept of strategic stability and the doctrine of mutual deterrence were "assimilated")—to persuade the Soviet side of the existence of an organic relationship between restrictions on ABM systems and the prospects of reductions in strategic offensive arms. Speaking of the hidden dangers associated with the development of ABM defenses in the context of stability, R. McNamara observed in 1967 that "if one side, the United States, for example, deploys an ABM system, the other will respond with an increase in its offensive possibilities, and this mutual relationship in an 'action-counteraction' system would be foolish and imprudent inasmuch as it would serve to crank up a senseless arms race."²

In the course of the development of the ABM Treaty representatives of the USSR took exception to the imposition of restrictions on possible future ABM defenses based on different physical principles on the pretext that a ban in this legal document of unknown "exotic" ABM

systems could impart to it an "uncertain and amoral" nature. Ultimately the USSR and the United States were able to reach a more or less concerted understanding of the compass of the ABM Treaty and of the essence of the ceilings recorded therein. The Soviet side accepted the proposition that "the main significance of the ABM Treaty is that its conclusion has halted the unfolding cycle of competition between the strategic offensive arms and defensive systems of the United States and the USSR."³

Despite the fact that for many years the ABM Treaty was an effective barrier in the way of the testing and deployment of antimissile systems, it has a number of so-called "gray areas" (insufficient specification of certain concepts) permitting differences in interpretation. As far as the USSR is concerned, the not unequivocally clarified nature of its position in respect to a number of limitations of the ABM Treaty stretched as a kind of "train" behind many pronouncements and actions in the anti-missile sphere.

Great repercussions were caused in the 1980's by the words, which the American side got hold of, of Marshal of the Soviet Union A. Grechko made in the process of ratification of the treaty. He maintained, in particular, that the treaty "does not impose any restrictions on research and experimental efforts geared to a solution of the problem of the country's protection against nuclear attack." These words were used by many people in the United States as proof that the USSR had from the very outset advocated a "broad interpretation" of the treaty, which, in fact, authorized also the creation and testing of a whole set of systems on "new physical principles" which did not exist at the time it was signed. The rapid explanations in our press—backdated at that—interpreted the marshal's words as pertaining solely to activity not banned by Article III, that is, geared to the refinement of systems and components only of fixed-site ground-based ABM defenses.

The question of what was, in fact, permitted by the treaty and what was prohibited in the sphere of the creation of antimissile systems became particularly pertinent following President R. Reagan's announcement in March 1983 of the SDI program. In accordance with the so-called "broad" interpretation of the ABM Treaty put forward in October 1985, the American side maintained, *inter alia*, that the treaty restrictions pertained to a ban on the creation, testing, and deployment of space-based ABM components only of the "traditional" varieties in existence at the time the treaty was signed.

In accordance with the viewpoint which gained currency at that time, these restrictions did not, allegedly, extend to devices based on the new physical principles mentioned in the so-called Agreed Statement D appended to the treaty. The Soviet position was that the provision of this statement concerning the possibility of the creation in the future of ABM systems based on different physical principles and containing components capable of substituting for missile interceptors, missile-interceptor

launchers, or ABM radar pertained only to the activity authorized in Article III in respect to the modernization of ABM ground sites.

Now, looking back, it may be said with every justification that in these few months, particularly from the fall of 1985 through the spring of 1986, the fate of the treaty hung by a hair. Some "indulgence" need only to have been allowed, and the treaty would inexorably have been eroded, having become a fiction. But two vectors of strength—the position of the Soviet side and influential political forces of the United States which opposed the administration's ambitious plans—confidently operated in one and the same direction at that time.

The "traditional" interpretation of the ABM Treaty thus gained powerful support on both sides of the ocean. In the course of the analysis of its problems Senator S. Nunn was able with the enlistment of the verbatim records of the negotiations themselves, the practice of compliance with the treaty, and other factors to demonstrate convincingly that the "broad" interpretation advanced by the U.S. Administration was incompetent.⁴

Thus the ABM Treaty confirmed, as it were, its right to be considered a most important legal document of the era of arms control, a cornerstone of strategic stability, a barrier against the spread of the arms race to a new sphere—outer space—and a key factor of the normal development of American-Soviet relations.

The U.S. Administration had no choice but to try to find ways to optimize research pertaining to the SDI program and to invent in order to carry out tests such a concept as "subcomponentry" (the testing of "ABM components" was banned by Article V of the treaty) and to call the tests themselves "demonstrations" lest it violate Congress' demands concerning compliance with the treaty "in the form in which it was signed in 1972."

It should be said that subsequently also Congress repeatedly unequivocally opposed encroachments on the treaty. It is sufficient to recall the attempts of Defense Secretary C. Weinberger to impose the "early-deployment plan" based on the use of "traditional," sufficiently perfected hardware (of kinetic, shock effect)—and in this respect very similar to the deployment plans which are being proposed at this time. Or the constant influence on the priority nature of programs within the SDI itself in order not to arrive at levels of the testing and, even more, deployment of systems representing a likeness of ABM componentry or the accelerated development of "exotic systems."

The main argument against such plans was the policy of the prevention of unilateral violations of the ABM Treaty adopted by the legislators. After many years of propagandistically embellished reiterative vociferous statements and accusations from our side of the Americans' violations of the treaty's limitations, our officials were forced without undue ceremony to acknowledge that there had been no violations. The additional paradox is that, after many years of no less vociferous

denials by spokesmen of the USSR of violations in connection with the construction of the Krasnoyarsk radar, we ultimately had to acknowledge a "procedural" violation of the treaty.

At the same time the American side attempted at the negotiations conducted in the period 1985-1991 in the Defense and Space Arms Group within the framework of the Soviet-American Nuclear and Space Arms Talks in Geneva to win our support for a proposal concerning the so-called "joint transition to a posture of greater emphasis on defense," that is, for the idea, in fact, of joint participation in realization of the SDI program.

Reasonably distrusting the American promises to share technology (we may recall if only M.S. Gorbachev's words in Reykjavik concerning the United States' refusal to supply equipment for dairies), the Soviet delegation insistently tried to prove the importance of compliance with the ABM Treaty, refuting, in passing, charges (at sessions of the ABM Treaty Permanent Consultative Commission included) of a violation of the treaty's provisions in connection with the construction of the Krasnoyarsk radar.

Negotiations in the Defense and Space Group in Geneva could be cited as an example of the stagnant negotiating process quite characteristic of the period of the end of the "golden age of disarmament"—the 1980's: what was most important thereat was not so much the achievement of results as the creation of the appearance of a dialogue between the superpowers, which was in itself valued at that time of confrontation.

The differences in the parties' approaches to problems of future ABM systems was so obvious that no attempts of the Soviet delegation—by way of the presentation of quite confused ideas like the proposal for agreement on a fixed "period of nonwithdrawal" from the (termless) ABM Treaty (with the obvious purpose of keeping the United States if only somehow from the "immediate" deployment of SDI components as they became ready and winning time for the Soviet military-industrial complex)—could extricate the negotiations from the mire of bogged-down discussion, more precisely, from the endless repetition of a set of "arguments" known in advance. Nor were solutions found in the course of the numerous meetings of the heads of the two countries' diplomatic departments in 1987-1990, at which they tried to discover diverse formulas of the "Washington" or "Wyoming" type, say.

Having cranked up the flywheel of a broad-scale propaganda campaign concerning the "sinister imperialist" plans for "star wars" (which rivaled in scale the "struggle for the hearts and minds" of the West Europeans and in defense of the deployment of the SS-20 missiles, which was conducted in parallel), the then Soviet leadership itself, it would seem, created for itself the threat so necessary for the national military-industrial complex, one of a qualitatively new nature, what is more.

Despite the official announcements concerning the development in the USSR of an "asymmetrical response" to the SDI (the main emphasis in which was put, as is understandable, on the "attrition" of such future antimissile defenses by a quantitative increase in the Soviet ICBM's and perfection of the weapons for overcoming ABM defenses,⁵ the statements of the Soviet leadership of that time reflected a profound inferiority complex and recognition of the ever-increasing gap between the two military superpowers in the development of the latest, "high" technology.

The Soviet side's concern was further increased because the channeling of substantial resources into the shaping of new programs in the ABM field was unlikely in the most difficult socioeconomic situation in which the country had found itself by the start of "perestroika" as a result of the unchecked military preparations throughout the "stagnation" period. At the same time, however, the Soviet side linked certain hopes with the fact that, in its opinion, even the United States would not be able to undertake efforts in respect to the SDI program at full stretch on account of the restrictions imposed by Congress.

The developing situation could not have been to the liking of the U.S. Administration. The SDI program, which had undergone fundamental revisions in the course of the pushing through Congress of the annual budgets of the SDI Organization, had come to be in the position of a Soviet construction facility, as it were—an "incomplete," in which huge resources had already been invested, but which, nonetheless, there was no possibility of completing. The main thing was to demonstrate if only a partial success and to bring to the final stage if only individual projects.

There had under these conditions to be shady stunts (like the evacuation of air from an ICBM stage hit by a ground laser, which created the effect of an explosion), which were presented as successful and efficient tests. Many such forgeries were uncovered by a small group of congressmen with the participation of Senator W. Proxmire and formed the basis of a special report in this connection.

At the same time, on the other hand, "centrists"—quite sober-minded politicians who understood that it was no longer possible to completely deny the American military-industrial complex and the forces backing it, even more to halt so sophisticated a program of research and development as SDI—had begun to strengthen as an equivalent force of the diametrically opposite positions in respect to the prospects of ABM defenses in the U.S. Congress and in American political life. Nor was it possible to create the illusion of "connivance" on the part of the legislators. Hence the solution was to channel this program, accompanying it with a multitude of reservations and restrictions (the main one of which was compliance with the terms of the ABM Treaty). Senator S. Nunn proposed the ALPS concept—a limited system

of protection against accidental ballistic missile launches as an alternative to the SDI program in its traditional "astro-cupola" version.⁶

The prospect of the deployment by the United States of a broad-based ABM defense with space-based components has been interpreted in our press as practically predetermined. But there are appreciable legislative restrictions in this connection which have been adopted by the U.S. Congress. In accordance with them, the secretary of defense is, truly, as an "initial step," being charged with the creation of an ABM system (100 ground-based interceptors) deployed in a single area and corresponding—which is very important—to the ABM Treaty limitations. At the same time, however, Congress is demanding that the President of the United States "embark on immediate discussion" with the other side "of the prospects and mutual interest in respect to amendments to the ABM Treaty" for a solution of the question of the possibility of the deployment of additional antimissile weapons besides those authorized by the treaty. It is emphasized here that the deployment of space-based antimissile components—so-called "brilliant pebbles," about which so much is being written in our press—is not a part of the plan of initial measures.

In what direction should the further development of the U.S. position on this matter be forecast? To a considerable extent the determining role here will belong to ourselves: If Russia declares as its goal the creation in conjunction with the United States of an "active" defense system with the possibility of an expansion of the number of ground-based interceptors (which, as we can see, corresponds to the long-term interests of the United States) and wins American support for this idea, this alone would create ideal conditions for preparations for the abandonment of the ABM Treaty and would afford opportunities for a new twist of the arms race spiral. If, on the other hand, we display restraint and take the path of realization of the idea of global protection in accordance with a "moderate version"—in the form, for example, of the creation of joint systems of the early warning of a nuclear attack—then, and this may be said with all certainty, the supporters of SDI in the United States would find themselves faced with a difficult choice, and it would be hard for them to venture a unilateral violation of the ABM Treaty, the more so under the conditions of Congress' traditional emphatic opposition to such plans.

Political Ambitions or Military-Technical Feasibility?

Availing itself of a change in the political situation and the assumption of office of the Bush administration, the military-strategic elite of the United States put forward a new concept—"limited ABM defense." It was formulated, in particular, in the President's annual State of the Union address on 29 January 1991, which spoke of the reorientation of SDI toward the creation of a global system of protection against limited strikes—GPALS.

Specifically, a future ABM system could include:

1) mobile-based tactical missile interceptors (in particular, the modernized Patriot missile air defense system and the ERINT and THAAD ACES antimissile being developed in conjunction with Israel on the basis of the Arrow missile);

2) a limited—750 GBI ground-based interceptors (exo-atmospheric intercept) and E²I (endo- and exo-atmospheric intercept)—system of the ABM defense of territory of the United States geared to the interception of about 200 warheads fired on an accidental or unsanctioned launch (as U.S. experts believe, this is the most likely version—this many could be launched, for example, by the command personnel of a strategic submarine or of a position area ICBM which has gotten out of control). GSTS target surveillance and tracking sensors "ejected" into space on the receipt of a signal of a missile attack pertain here.

Formalized in the form of an official American proposal at the Defense and Space Arms Talks, the very idea of GPALS encountered, nonetheless, a very cool response from the Soviet side, which continued to maintain that it would evaluate all new ideas in the ABM sphere from the viewpoint of their conformity to the task of strengthening strategic stability and preventing an arms race in space recorded by the parties in 1985 as key goals of the Nuclear and Space Arms Talks.⁷

The Soviet representatives emphasized that the question of some revisions being made to the current ABM posture could be examined on the practical plane only under conditions where qualitatively new allied relations based on an analysis of actual threats (including the proliferation of missile technology in the Third World or unsanctioned or accidental missile launches) had taken shape between our countries and also in the event of productive accords on key conceptual aspects of the relationship between strategic offensive and defensive arms having been reached. Soviet officials observed here that the readiness to discuss the new proposals of the United States on nonnuclear ABM systems expressed on 5 October 1991 by M.S. Gorbachev did not signify agreement with them.

The main point in Moscow's reasoning was the proposition that the threats for which GPALS was being created could be repelled far more cheaply and efficiently with the aid of available political-diplomatic and organizational-technical measures. It cannot be said that the achievement of this restrained position was conflict-free: even at that time, in October, another "test of the pen" by our military-industrial complex was made—what if it were possible to advance a position providing for "full-scale" cooperation in the ABM sphere?

The debate surrounding the problem of a limited ABM defense, the deployment of which would seem the sole practicable type in the immediate future, presupposes also a realistic, impartial evaluation of the spectrum of threats against which it is targeted. Even the appearance of new members of the nuclear club in the Third World

would with the least probability lead to their manufacture of strategic ballistic delivery systems for weapons of mass destruction. The drawbacks of such a path—the considerable amount of time it would take (of the order 10-15 years), the need for large-scale appropriations, and the existence of a developed production-engineering and scientific base, that is, the presence of a complex of factors which the countries of the "South" lack—are obvious.

In addition, it would be practically impossible to conceal the development of such a missile program, just as it would be difficult to conceal exports of technical components from overseas. Having revealed the dangerous nature of events, the civilized world could call on the specific country to cease building up its potential in this way, and if it refused, apply a broad set of sanctions, up to and including the destruction of this potential by military means. The absence of the ideologized opposition of two political systems hitherto manifested in the practically "automatic" support for this authoritarian regime or the other affords at the present time a unique opportunity for the implementation of joint actions on behalf of the whole world community, which was in fact demonstrated at the time of the events in the Persian Gulf.

All countermeasures would be considerably cheaper than any system of protection of a global scale employing new ABM technology. By an irony of fate the emergence of the missile threat in the "third world" has been brought about by our own indiscriminating military-technical policy which presupposed active supplies to temporary partners and allies in the Arab world of the celebrated Scud-B (R-17) missiles.

The danger of an accidental or unsanctioned launch of strategic missiles in our direction has been ruled out practically thanks to the existence in the United States of almost consummate blocking procedures. The entire history of the missile confrontation has known not a single example of the "false launch" of a combat missile. In addition, such a threat may be combated far more effectively by perfecting the organizational-technical mechanisms of the prevention of undesirable launches which already exist (fitting all ICBM's and SLBM's with built-in mechanisms of self-destruction in flight, for example).

The main point, however, is that any ABM system is ineffective in a purely military respect and does not provide a guarantee against "nonmissile" threats—a nuclear explosive device could, after all, be carried without any particular difficulty by terrorists in a suitcase or triggered in an unmanned aircraft. In addition, there are also special means for overcoming ABM defenses—be they the use of dummy warheads or warheads gliding, like a cruise missile, at the approach-to-target stage.

In October 1991 the United States proposed in Geneva negotiations on a new ABM posture which would replace

the current treaty posture and permit the parties to undertake for protection against limited strikes with the aid of ballistic missiles the limited deployment of anti-missile systems which in terms of scale would go beyond the framework of the treaty's restrictions.⁸

It should be noted that up to a particular period, in response, evidently, to the Soviet concerns expressed earlier, the Americans promised to abide by the ABM Treaty. They proposed negotiation on specific aspects of agreement to the deployment of ABM systems for the purpose of guaranteeing preservation of the effectiveness of the strategic deterrent force. The Soviet side, however, constantly expressed, through the end of 1991, at least, misgivings that GPALS could easily be converted into a full-scale "dense" system of the ABM defense of the territory of the United States with space-based components and could in this way undermine the strategic balance between the USSR and the United States.

Of course, predominant in the apprehensions lest the United States avail itself of its advantages in technology and—via a buildup of antimissile systems of protection against a massive strike and measures "imposed" by it pertaining to the "de-MIRVing" and the elimination of the Soviet strategic missiles with MIRV'd warheads and a general reduction in our strategic offensive arms—arrive at positions of unequivocal military superiority is the former perception of the United States as the main potential enemy, not today's "partner" and "ally".⁹ At the same time the proposition that we regard no one as a probable aggressor could hardly from the military viewpoint serve as a convincing argument in support of a unilateral and unthinking reduction in military potential without regard for the actual threats, which, unfortunately, persist in the world, for our state included.

At the same time, on the other hand, no military threats to Russia which exist currently or which are conceivable in the immediate future, it would seem, dictate the need for its deployment of some new ABM systems. In such a delicate field as military organizational development and security it is extremely important that all practical steps be taken not in deference to the mood of the moment or a desire to please one's partner in diplomatic dialogue even but that they ensue from an in-depth analysis of military-political realities and economic-technological possibilities.

In this connection, as specialists observe, the initiative formulated on the eve of the winter visit to the United States in the statement of B.N. Yeltsin of 19 January—the creation and joint operation with the United States of a global protection system for the world community, the basis of which "could be a reorientation of the United States' SDI with the use of high technology developed in Russia's defense complex"—marked a departure from the entire policy pertaining to the prevention of an arms race in space and preservation of the ABM Treaty which had been pursued hitherto and a new turning point in the whole of security policy.¹⁰

Around this proposal, which fundamentally changed the traditional Soviet concept in the sphere of strategic defensive arms, there immediately arose a keen debate, which, unfortunately, has yet to clarify the parties' positions.

Whereas, commenting on this idea, Ye. Shaposhnikov, commander in chief of CIS Joint Armed Forces, spoke about a system based "on space systems developed by Russia," it is, apparently, in Academician Ye. Velikhov's opinion, a question not of an ABM system but merely of an "early warning system," and by no means of introducing weapons into space.¹¹

At a meeting with the press the president of Russia himself emphasized that it was in fact contemplated converting the SDI into a joint system of global monitoring of the nuclear threat, whose functions would be essentially limited and should not include the interception of warheads: "It is a question merely of the joint tracking and warning of such a threat—up to the moment that the command is given, but no more."¹² It remains for specialists only to guess what is meant precisely: only the joint development of "noncombat" control and warning system or, on the other hand, the creation of "active" ABM weapons—ballistic missile intercept systems.

The process of formulation of our foreign policy initiatives continues to be of an anonymous nature. To judge by everything, this specific line of this proposal was backed by representatives of the military-industrial complex and scientific circles associated with it endeavoring to secure large-scale contracts for Russia's military industry under the cover of the present verbiage concerning "partner relations" with the United States and the creation of a "planetary" system of security. They maintain here that the defense flywheel would be cranked up in support, virtually, of "disarmament" and a strengthening of Russian-American relations. Aside from the leaders of defense industry, who are by nature of their occupation, so to speak, interested in the creation of GPALS as a factor of survival in a period of economic disintegration in the CIS and the sharp reduction in military spending, representatives of the Russian scientific community, political scientists, and independent military experts also championing the proposition concerning the need for our association with the American military developments and a revision of the ABM Treaty have joined actively in the debate.¹³

Behind the statements of certain experts to the effect that the ABM Treaty is no longer a "sacred cow" there is, unfortunately, an absence of an in-depth analysis of all military-strategic aspects connected with the new ABM posture. The transition from confrontational relations to partnership with the United States and the West as a whole would not seem to be as simple and painless a process as it appears to some of our political scientists—nor is it taking place in a vacuum. Both distrust between the military structures and the likelihood of conflicts of interests persist.

Despite the opportunities which have been afforded for a gradual rapprochement with the United States and the arrival in the future at purely allied relations such as exist within the NATO framework, Russia and the United States, as the biggest powers in the military respect, will for some time to come—if only by inertia—continue, for all that, to "deter" one another with their strategic offensive arms. Consequently, lest national measures in respect to the creation of such components cause mistrust, cooperation in the sphere of antimissile systems should be preceded by steps pertaining to the in-depth integration of military structures, the expansion of cooperation in a further reduction in strategic offensive arms, transition to the complementariness of military potentials, and the harmonization of military doctrines and strategies.¹⁴

First, it is unclear what, specifically, it is intended granting the Russian developers in the plane of technology exchange. Earlier the United States had rejected this outright, offering merely an exchange of selective information on a voluntary basis. It would be naive to suppose that the United States seriously intends involving itself in a buildup of Russia's military potential. The sole practicable joint project as yet would seem to be cooperation in the creation of a joint center for warning of ballistic missile launches—and even here it is not clear whether its functions would include anything besides an exchange of information in real time on detected threats. And at the same time, on the other hand, there is the possibility that the United States will embark on the deployment of its own antimissile so-called "active" ground- and space-based components. By our statements concerning a readiness for cooperation (without specifying in what precisely and to what extent) in the sphere of "protection of the international community" we are merely considerably facilitating the task of the supporters of SDI and the realization of their plans and undermining the actions of the U.S. Congress in respect to limitation of the scale of this program. In order to avoid this it is essential that we state unambiguously the purposes of the system we are proposing and its specific architecture and the linkage of these actions with compliance with the ABM Treaty.

Second, according to official SDI estimates, such a deployment is to cost the American taxpayers \$41 billion, and according to the calculations of the well-known expert G. Pike, citing the usual Pentagon practice of overspending, from \$40 billion to \$150 billion.¹⁵ It is incomprehensible why Russia would agree to such expenditure in a situation of economic collapse, when literally every ruble counts. "Humanitarian assistance"—hard currency financing from the Pentagon for our development and manufacture of antimissile systems—for which the leaders of certain major defense design bureaus and enterprises are hoping,¹⁶ is hardly to be expected either.

The situation is intensified by the fact that, according to B. Yeltsin, our developments exist "only on paper" and have not even reached the testing stage, which will

require of us exceptionally big efforts for reaching the level of the United States if only in terms of several ABM-related projects.¹⁷ Consequently, despite the assurances heard at various levels, Russia's participation in the creation and operation of GPALS would lie as a heavy burden on its economy.

Finally, it is not known how the response to the creation of a "joint system of global protection" might be misconstrued in the CIS states. This could be seen there as Russia's endeavor to engage one further channel of a strengthening of its relations with the West at the expense of the interests of its closest neighbors. Ukraine or, say, Kazakhstan could take similar steps to deploy their own "local" GPALS. In addition, it is unclear as yet whether the republics' consent to the accommodation of facilities of the ramified structure of the future Russian part of a system of global protection (to take if only the problem of access to the Baykonur Cosmodrome and the Sary-Shagan ABM test range) could be obtained. The main thing, however, is that these outlays would be made practically in a void, for warding off mythical threats.

Nor should a benevolent response in other countries of the world, where we have been known as devotees of the ABM Treaty, be counted on. Available evidence confirms such a conclusion. In addition, it should be expected that the countries which are not party to the new system of global protection would be concerned at the decline in the deterrence potential of their nuclear weapons and would embark on an increase in their strategic potentials, causing a chain reaction for a new twist of the arms race spiral. A new threat to strategic stability and security would thereby arise.

True, one path remains open to us, as before—and many people in the West here are attempting to "think up" the Russian position in a positive key, seeing our proposal as a call for the realization of "global monitoring" of the nuclear threat (emanating now not from the West), by which is understood merely the joint tracking and warning of such a danger up to the moment the command is given, and no more.

We have, obviously, to agree with V. Lopatin, former deputy chairman of the Russian State Committee for Defense, who emphasized that realization of the initiative concerning the creation of a joint ABM system "would cause merely a new spiraling of the arms race, which is, once again, to the advantage not of Russia, which has announced demilitarization, but the military-industrial complex, which we have inherited and which combines the interests of the generals from industry and the army."¹⁸

In actual fact, it would be absurd while winding down the arms race in some areas to be stimulating it in new spheres, in deference to dubious political schemes to boot. It is possible, of course, to consider the ABM Treaty a legal document of the era of stagnation and seek therein, as in any such treaty, the inevitable vagaries and provisions which have become outdated with the passage

of time. But the main thing, evidently, is the fact that the ABM Treaty is curbing the spread of the arms race in particular directions and in particular spheres.

Of course, the criteria of strategic stability are now changing, and the view thereof as a system providing for the prevention of a big war of opposed blocs is being called in question altogether. Russia intends moving along the path of the development of qualitatively new, partner relations with the United States, in the sphere of security included, and developing them to the point of real allied relations (the United States is remaining silent, it is true, as regards its plans on this score), which should be the case with two states with more or less common ideals and concepts of foreign policy.

In such a system it would, naturally, be an anachronism to say that the guidance of weapons into space would stimulate, say, a temptation to inflict under certain conditions a preemptive strike on the space-based ABM facilities of the other side and the development of our own ABM forces and would undermine "parity" (which, it is not known why, Russia must have with the United States).¹⁹ Such a development of events, aside from its absurdity, would in itself have directly destabilizing consequences also. Thus the possibility of the destruction of space-based facilities of the other side, our Mir space station, or satellites of another state, say, as a consequence of an error of the computer systems, a sensor malfunction, and so forth would persist.

There would also be an abrupt jump in the plane of militarization of one further natural environment. Nothing in the strategic situation in the world as of this time testifies to the appearance of serious new threats to the highest interests of the United States or Russia. A missile attack on the territory of the United States, or of Russia even, in the very near future is extremely unlikely. The danger of the proliferation of ballistic missile technology in countries of the Third World, which has to a large extent been unduly dramatized, is covered by existing (the S-300 complex in the case of Russia) or prospective (modifications to the Patriot air defense missile battery, ERINT, ACES, and THAAD in the case of the United States) tactical ABM systems, the refinement of which is not limited by the ABM Treaty in the least.

Such mobile systems could in principle, if necessary, cover the border areas of Russia or, say, the armed forces of the United States and its allies overseas. But a more in-depth analysis of the current potentials of tactical missiles and their prospective development in various countries testifies that there is as of the present no in any way significant threat to Russia in this area.

Ultimately, in the event of a dangerous development of the situation, there remains the possibility of a certain increase in the number of ground-based position area ABM defenses (this could be done, for example, in a separate protocol to the Treaty without altering its wording or the essence of its restrictions), if security

considerations were to testify in favor of this or the parties were to decide that a real danger of the unsanctioned launch of ICBM's or SLBM's had, indeed, suddenly arisen.²⁰ In any event, such actions are practically ruled out for Russia for the immediate future of economic reform, nor does anything in the world military-strategic situation dictate to us such steps.

At the same time, however, the efforts of the two parties could be focused on joint developments and the creation and joint operation of a system of the control of outer space and a warning of missile launches, which could in the future be common to the whole world community.

The creation of such a system would not affect the letter and spirit of the ABM Treaty and would contribute to a strengthening of strategic stability and international security. It would also lead to the conclusive neutralization in Russia and the United States of the inducements to continue or resume military competition with one another and would serve as an important factor of a strengthening of American-Russian interaction.

In order to remove possible suspicions of an aspiration to some condominium of the two superpowers the future global protection system (without combat components) should be open to the participation of all states of the world, without, of course, detriment to their sovereignty and, of course, without impediments to the peaceful conquest of space. Such a complex system of information support using ground- and space-based facilities warning of a missile attack and monitoring outer space would be created in stages.

The question of an exchange of information in real time could be considered at the first stage.

At the second, a joint warning system, which would provide the parties with fuller, more reliable, and prompter information on the situation in space and on ballistic missile launches, would preclude the possibility of the adoption of wrong decisions on account of false alarms or a misinterpretation of the actions of other parties at the time of test or training missile launches, would detect and determine undeclared missile launches, and would effectively monitor the nonproliferation of missile and space weapons, could be created. Subsequently this system could be interpreted in a joint ballistic missile launch early warning center, whose specific infrastructure and tasks would be developed by experts of Russia and the United States.

Before switching to some further actions in the sphere of joint antimissile defenses, it is essential to conduct an in-depth investigative study—in conjunction with the United States and other countries—of the actuality and the scale of existing and potential "nuclear threats": on the part of countries of the "third world," the likelihood of accidental and unsanctioned launches, and so forth. The results of such studies should be jointly discussed at the political level. Only such a civilized and open path of decisionmaking corresponds to the possibilities and the current status of states' interaction.

Yet there is evidence that on both sides of the ocean secret study and attempts at working interaction at the most varied levels in the sphere of the creation of joint protection with strike elements of various basing modes continue. The Russian Council for the Analysis of Critical Situations has, if press reports are to be believed, reached some accord with representatives of American companies on the creation of a "global system of protection against limited nuclear strikes," within whose framework the deployment of a space-based ABM echelon is contemplated. Few people know of the essence of the arrangement. Work of a special commission formed in April, which was entrusted, *inter alia*, with the development of a concept and practical proposals pertaining to a global protection system for the international community, has also been performed behind closed doors, but in such a way that this becomes known to the mass media. The commission's work has been of an exclusively departmental nature, and now, what is more, as distinct from the past "stagnation" times, the balanced "parity" representation of all interested departments at such discussions is not even obligatory.

The question of the essence and expediency of a global protection system for the world community, the scale and form of Russia's participation therein, and the correlativity of this system to the current mutual restrictions in the sphere of antimissile defenses could mean as of this time either a fundamental turnabout or an important adjustment of Russia's entire military-political course. And deciding such a question by way of secret discussions is impermissible. Our diplomacy has repeatedly in recent years had at a price of enormous efforts to rectify the irresponsible and opportunist anonymous decisions of past years in the military sphere, and our economy—we do not yet know whether it will recover from the boundless tilt toward military programs. And before adopting any decision on joint measures with the United States on the creation of a system of protection of the world community, the question should be scrupulously framed and publicly decided at the parliamentary level in general terms, namely: What will the essence and scale of this cooperation be, and does Russia have a vital need and the actual possibilities for it.

The orientation toward the priority development precisely of early warning and information exchange systems as the key component of a global protection system in the very near future was confirmed in the joint Russian-American statement signed by the presidents of the two countries on 17 June 1992. It was decided to create a high-level group for the purpose of commencement of the formulation of a concept of a global protection system. It will consider such practical steps as the creation of an early warning center and the potential of cooperation with other states in the development of the hardware and technology for defense against ballistic missiles and also the legal basis of cooperation, including new treaties and agreements and possible revisions to current treaties necessary for realization of a global

protection system. The Russian side emphasized its commitment to the ABM Treaty here.

We would like to hope this treaty remains stable and that space continues in the future to be free of an arms race of any kind.

Footnotes

1. See IZVESTIYA 11 February 1967.
2. Quoted from A. Chayes and J. Wiesner, "ABM. An Evaluation of the Decision to Deploy an Antiballistic Missile System," New York, 1969, pp 239-240.
3. PRAVDA 30 September 1972.
4. See Senator S. Nunn, "Interpretation of the ABM Treaty," March 11-13, 1987, Washington, 1987.
5. See, for example, interview with General of the Army Yu. Maksimov, commander in chief of Strategic Rocket Forces (NOVOYE VREMYA No 51, 1986).
6. ARMS CONTROL TODAY, April 1989, pp 17-22.
7. See, for example, the article by Lt Gen F. Ladygin in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA of 20 November 1991.
8. THE NEW YORK TIMES 15 October 1991.
9. See, for example, A. Dokuchayev's article in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA of 27 February 1992.
10. Quoted from ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA 3 February 1992.
11. Interview with Marshal Ye. Shaposhnikov of 31 January 1992; Ye. Velikhov in MOSKOVSKIY KOMSOMOLETS of 5 February 1992.
12. Quoted from NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA 5 February 1992.
13. See, for example, the articles of A. Savelyev in NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA of 18 February 1992 and in IZVESTIYA of 4 March 1992. A considerable contribution to the propaganda of GPALS was also made by Academician N. Moiseyev (ZA RUBEZHOM No 34, 1991).
14. See A. Arbatov's article "Joint SDI: Would It Help Anyone's Security" in NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA of 4 March 1992.
15. "Chicken Little and Darth Vader. Is the Sky Really Falling? Space Policy Project." Federation of American Scientists, 1 October 1991.
16. See, for example, KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA of 6 February 1992.
17. Quoted from ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA 3 February 1992.
18. IZVESTIYA 13 February 1992.

19. See, for example, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA of 20 November 1991.

20. Such proposals are being made by Soviet authors also—see, for example, V. Kozin's article "From Confrontation to Trust" in NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA of 28 February 1992.

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U.S.-Russian Consultations Begin on Global Defense

LD2109105392 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
0855 GMT 21 Sep 92

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Igor Ignatyev]

[Text] Washington September 21 TASS—Two-day Russian-U.S. consultations on "a global defence system" began in Washington on Monday [21 September], conducted by the U.S. officials and a Russian delegation led by Deputy Foreign Minister Mr. Mamedov.

It is the first meeting of Russian and American experts after the first round of consultations, held in Moscow in July, which will work out a joint concept of "the global defence system" as part of the general strategy concerning ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction.

Experts believe additional measures should be taken to strengthen the existing regimes of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and means of their delivery.

A problem will undoubtedly be discussed of how to let other U.S. allies and other countries concerned join the discussion of a global defence system.

Experts are to work out the schedule of the discussions and get down to the work on a juridical basis for cooperation, including new treaties and agreements, and possible amendments to the existing treaties.

Russia believes that the establishment of an early warning centre might be the first practical step to facilitate the discussion of potential advantages of the global defence system.

U.S.-Russian Joint Statement on Global Defense

LD2309161792 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service
in Russian 0115 GMT 23 Sep 92

["Joint Statement on the Consultations about a Global Defense System on 22 September 1992"—ITAR-TASS headline]

[Text] [no dateline as received] High-ranking Russian and U.S. delegations headed by Russian Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister Georgiy Mamedov, U.S. presidential aide Dennis Ross, and Undersecretary of State for International Security Affairs Frank Wisner held a meeting in Washington on 21-22 September aimed at continuing

the discussions begun in Moscow in July on the matter of a global defense system [GDS]. These consultations are the outcome of an accord reached between Presidents Yeltsin and Bush regarding the fact that their countries must work jointly with their allies and other interested states with the aim of elaborating a concept for a GDS as part of an overall strategy on the proliferation of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction. The high-level group held its first meeting in Moscow in July this year; the current meeting is the second.

An extremely positive discussion of all of the appropriate questions took place. The Russian and U.S. sides agreed that both countries are moving along the road of searching for answers to the challenges of the future in the security sphere, as partners and friends. One of the conclusions is that weapons of mass destruction and the means of supplying them still represent a threat to Russia, the United States, their allies, and other members of the world community. Faced with this common danger, they discussed the potential advantages of a GDS in which a wide range of interested states would participate, which would in turn strengthen international security and stability.

The discussions encompassed a wide range of issues, including:

- A detailed discussion on the GDS concept, including the matter of its joint nature;
- How the GDS might be the catalyst for a more active dialogue between its members on security matters;
- The exchange of information on technologies in extensive use;
- Possible technical projects on the basis of cooperation, including projects directed toward enhancing defense capacities;
- How GDS members might themselves exploit its advantages and grant them to others;
- Russian and U.S. ideas regarding the future legal basis of the GDS;
- An exchange of information on advance warning, including demonstration experiments;

The working groups set up in July have been instructed to present their recommendations on the possible means and methods for implementing the GDS to the next meeting of the high-level group. They will hold their sittings in October this year. Meanwhile, Russia and the United States will continue discussing the GDS with other states, in order to lay the foundations for extensive international participation in it.

Article Examines Global Air Defense Development

MK2409120192 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 23 Sep 92 p 2

[Maksim Tarasenko commentary under "Opinion" rubric: "SDI—Anti-SDI. Global Protection or a Big Nothing?"]

[Text] Six months have already elapsed since Russian President Boris Yeltsin called on the United States to jointly develop an antimissile defense system (in place of the Strategic Defense Initiative), thus effecting a virtual 180-degree turn in our official attitude toward the "star wars" program.

At the Russian-American top-level meeting in June the sides signed a memorandum of agreement (to elaborate jointly with allies and other interested states a concept for a global system of protection against a limited ballistic missile strike).

A working meeting between representatives of the U.S. and Russian space departments was held 10-11 June in Washington, half of which was devoted to a discussion of the prospects of military cooperation in space. Another meeting was held in Moscow in mid-July, in which, on the American side, the U.S. assistant secretary of the Air Force for space issues participated alongside the director of NASA. Need it be said that it did not prove possible to obtain any details on the content and results of these meetings? The central press did not even make any mention of the meetings themselves.

However, it is not hard to predict the concept of future military-space cooperation which can be elaborated by the inventors' collectives that have been working for 10 years on the American SDI and the Soviet "asymmetric response."

But maybe now, following the end of the cold war, we really need to change our attitude toward SDI, particularly since we are no longer talking about its original concept but about a so-called system of "global protection against limited strikes" [GPALS]?

First of all, it must be specified that the new concept—GPALS—is utterly different from the old SDI.

The aim of SDI was to create an impenetrable shield against a massive missile strike by the USSR. In eight years of work even the program's most ardent supporters saw the technical impossibility of creating such a system. And when, as a result of the detente in Soviet-U.S. relations and the first steps toward the reduction of nuclear arsenals, the threat of a Soviet strike started to recede rapidly, the Americans were left with the choice of either finding another, more modest aim for the program, or scrapping it.

A suitable aim was obligingly suggested by Saddam Husayn. Future ABM defense systems' specifications and performance characteristics which now appear

attainable could in principle ensure the repulsing of a third-country strike by a force of up to 200 warheads.

But even if you agree that a system for protection against a limited strike is technically possible, does this mean that its creation will really enhance the world community's security?

While alluding to threats on the part of third countries, it is relevant to recall that the aggression of many of them over a period of decades was stimulated, or at least materially supported, by the rival superpowers. If the confrontation between the United States and the former USSR is really replaced by cooperation, only a madman would risk challenging the world community, irrespective of whether he has an ABM defense system.

As for mad dictators, who are essentially the reason why it is being proposed that the system be constructed, it would not be a bad idea to look at the system beforehand from the viewpoint of those against whom we are planning to protect ourselves.

The creation by Russia and the United States of a joint system of ABM defense against third countries will only intensify our former allies' feeling that they have been betrayed and have been left "within a circle of enemies" (Cuba, North Korea). A feeling of doom rarely helps you think rationally.

It is clear that when the two leading nuclear powers start creating a system that devalues the nuclear arsenals of third countries, these countries will start looking for ways of overcoming ABM systems.

This path had already been found and taken by the USSR and the United States at the end of the 1960's—building up the number of missiles, developing multiple reentry vehicles, installing decoy targets. Thus begins the endless race of defensive and offensive systems. The USSR and U.S. leaderships of the time were able to realize this and agree on restricting ABM defense systems. Renewing just such a race at the level of superpowers—third-world nuclear countries will scarcely prove less destabilizing and destructive.

This circumstance provides us with another reason for retaining the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (1972). The ABM Treaty directly prohibits the development, testing, and deployment of ABM systems of any basing mode which ensure the protection of a country's whole territory.

Since the treaty is bilateral, it can be abrogated with the mutual agreement of the sides. But even if you allow that the improvement in Russian-American relations is already so profound and irreversible that the ABM Treaty has lost its direct significance in restricting the arms race between the two superpowers, it is expedient to retain it as an effective example of the leading nuclear powers' desire for disarmament and an object lesson for

the campaign to prevent a similar race at the emergent new line of North-South confrontation.

For defense against the currently existing missile threat, however, it would be quite sufficient to create a system of regional defense against tactical missiles as well as a global early warning system. This would provide "a morsel" for the defense sectors and would not contravene the ABM Treaty, sparing the United States and Russia from any suspicion of a conspiracy against the third world.

The deterrence of a missile threat on the part of third countries should be sought not by trying to make their missile weapons "powerless and obsolete" (which is what Reagan wanted to do with Soviet missile weapons), but by extending and improving the international regime for monitoring [kontrol za] missile technology and, naturally, by taking every possible political step to normalize international relations. Remember, the end of the cold war was initiated not by Reagan's "position of strength" but by Gorbachev's "new political thinking."

The missile technology monitoring regime must be significantly improved and transformed from the purely prohibitive Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls [Cocom] rules to a genuinely international regime which, like the International Atomic Energy Agency's nuclear technology regime, would promote the development of peaceful missile technology under effective international control.

However, as yet the proposals on joint work to create a global protection system, as Academician Yevgeniy Velikhov and First Deputy Defense Minister Andrey Kokoshin have noted, "have met with practically no objections either among designers or among scientists." This is not surprising, because all the relevant designers were working on "our answer to SDI" and practically all prestigious scientists in the relevant spheres have made their contribution by working on economic contracts. And now that state budget financing is drying up, it is not criticism of the American program that will promise material support, but the continuation of the previous work together with our former adversaries.

But the fact that the undoubtedly important problem of the survival of our missile-space industry today may not be so close to the taxpayer's heart is no reason to palm off on him in exchange a hypothetical protection against a presumed threat.

CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN EUROPE

Estonia Holds Steady on Russian Troop Withdrawal Time Frame

*LD2209182792 Tallinn Radio Estonia in English
1520 GMT 21 Sep 92*

[Text] Estonia still demands the Russian troops to be pulled out from its territory by the summer of 1993. The attack units, as well as all the troops stationed in the

capital city Tallinn, are (?to be) withdrawn already by the end of 1992. The government delegations of Estonia and Russia have held six rounds of talks, reaching agreement in some minor issues. There has been no agreement so far over the matters of troop withdrawal, [word indistinct] or citizenship.

Further on Russian-Lithuanian Troop Withdrawal Agreement

Landsbergis Sees 'Continuing Threat'

AU2809184392 Berlin NEUE ZEIT in German
23 Sep 92 p 6

[Interview with Vytautas Landsbergis by Maria Graczyk in Vilnius; date not given: "We Are Expanding Europe"]

[Excerpt] [Graczyk] The last barricades are being removed in front of the parliament. No Soviet tanks are seen nearby. Has the danger to your country disappeared?

[Landsbergis] The tanks are positioned 10 minutes away from the parliament. We consider their presence—the presence of Russian troops on Lithuanian territory—as a continuing threat. There are still many troops with great offensive capability—let me stress this—with great offensive and not defensive capability! Thus, the security of the Lithuanian state will depend considerably on further developments in Russia, on the continued existence of a democratic government in Moscow.

[Graczyk] Are you saying that Lithuania is only an independent state on paper?

[Landsbergis] No. Above all, our parliament, our government, and all the legislation adopted after the declaration of independence in March 1990 are proof of our sovereignty. We also have our own police and administrative system, which may not yet be very efficient, but which was reformed on the basis of our own laws. Thus, the remnants of the former Soviet Union on our territory are the foreign army, which will now withdraw from our country, and the ruble, which will also be replaced shortly. We are currently working on the introduction of our own currency, the litas. [passage omitted]

Army Train To Leave Vilnius 25 Sep

LD2409222492 Vilnius Radio Vilnius International
Service in Lithuanian 2100 GMT 24 Sep 92

[Text] According to information available to Radio Vilnius, the first train consisting of 40 cars carrying military equipment, ammunition, officers, and their families of the Russian Army's 107th Division from the so-called Northern townlet in the capital, will leave Vilnius tomorrow. This Russian Army train is leaving for a new place of deployment in Moscow oblast. Thus, the implementation of the agreement on the withdrawal of the Russian Army from Vilnius by the end of November of this year is starting.

The train should have left Vilnius today, but due to delays in loading and the inability of the customs officials to inspect the train in good time, its departure has been postponed until tomorrow.

Landsbergis, Yeltsin Agree on Pullout Meeting

OW2509174892 Moscow BALTFAX in English
1540 GMT 25 Sep 92

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Head of Lithuanian parliament Vytautas Landsbergis and Russian President Boris Yeltsin agreed on Thursday [24 September] during a phone conversation that the groups developing bilateral agreements on the removal of Russian troops would meet in October.

On Friday the Lithuanian parliament's press representative said that Yeltsin even announced that he had given state secretary to the Russian President Gennadiy Burbulis the order to activate work to prepare for a meeting of the two countries' leaders.

As is already known, on September 8th Yeltsin refused to sign the primary agreement in a packet of Lithuanian-Russian documents on troop removal from Lithuania by August 31 1993, claiming the text needed improvement. It is thought that the agreement will be signed during the meeting of the two leaders either on October 1st or 2nd. Presently the Russian parliament's committee on international affairs has distributed a statement which calls on Yeltsin to postpone the meeting and turn the agreement over to the Supreme Soviet for revision.

Motorized Division Begins Withdrawal

LD2509174592 Vilnius Radio Vilnius Network
in Lithuanian 1400 GMT 25 Sep 92

[Text] The BALTIC NEWS SERVICE reports that the 107th Motorized Infantry Division has started its departure from Lithuania. The first trainload with approximately 90 units of military equipment departed last Monday from the military camp in Ukmerge and the Kopusteliai forest near Ukmerge.

According to Stasys Knezys, the representative of the Lithuanian Government for issues on the withdrawal of the Army, the armored forces and other military equipment of the 107th Division are concentrated in these places. Mr. Knezys told a BALTIC NEWS SERVICE correspondent that a few days ago he approved an application by division representatives to send a second trainload of military hardware. By 25 October, all units of this motorized infantry division should have left Ukmerge.

The division's garrison, the so called Northern townlet in Vilnius, is much slower to move. Although it has also started moving, 1,500 servicemen say they are unable to move faster because 60 percent of the townlet's contingent are officers.

According to the timetable on the withdrawal of the Russian Army, the main forces of the 107th Motorized Infantry Division must leave Lithuania by the end of November, and the entire division must depart by the end of this year.

Lithuanian Defense Minister Comments

*MK3009101592 Moscow KURANTY in Russian
30 Sep 92 p 6*

[Interview with Audrius Butkevicius, national defense minister, by Yevgeniy Krutikov; date, place not given: "Russia in a Hurry To Withdraw Troops"]

[Text] Despite the fact that an agreement in principle has been reached on the schedule and sequence of the withdrawal of Russian troops from Lithuania, a great deal remains unclear in the sides' mutual relations. Officials are trying to clarify the situation as much as they can. Audrius Butkevicius, Lithuanian Republic national defense minister, for example, believes that Russia is in a hurry to withdraw the troops.

[Krutikov] Mr. Butkevicius, what is the numerical strength and composition of the Russian Army units being withdrawn from Lithuania?

[Butkevicius] The following are located on Lithuanian territory: coastal defense divisions, a motorized rifle division and an airborne division, a separate airborne assault battalion, a long-range artillery brigade, a rocket artillery regiment, a separate helicopter regiment, and a fighter aviation regiment. They are armed with 448 tanks, 1,253 infantry fighting vehicles and airborne fighting vehicles, 269 artillery pieces of a caliber exceeding 100 mm, 60 MiG-23 fighter-bombers, 61 helicopters, and 66 "Grad" and "Uragan" rocket launchers. Around 20,500 men altogether.

[Krutikov] Do these figures not seem an underestimation to you?

[Butkevicius] You know, I could not determine them definitively right until the final night before the meeting between Mr. Landsbergis and Mr. Yeltsin, and I only managed to do so right at the last moment.

[Krutikov] Is this connected with the stance of the Russian Defense Ministry?

[Butkevicius] We were rather surprised at not being able to get in touch with General Grachev quickly in Moscow. For a while, we believed that the meeting would be canceled, since Grachev was not receiving us and we could not specify the necessary technical details. We had already been informed that the Russian Ministry of Defense was actively opposed to the conclusion of a compromise treaty on the withdrawal of Russian troops from Lithuania. We informed our head of state about this, and he was forced to announce this publicly. After that, the process of coordinating certain technical details proceeded more quickly.

[Krutikov] Yes, but they have to monitor the status of their troops—units are now being withdrawn from Lithuania practically into open countryside, and the officers' economic position is very difficult....

[Butkevicius] However, these questions can be resolved in a different way. We were prepared to construct houses and new garrisons for them, but we were not prepared to pay cash. Ultimately this is the Russian command's problem: As far as we know, a significant proportion of these subunits, including the elite paratroop division from Kaunas, will be withdrawn to the Caucasus. Russia itself has been interested in the withdrawal of significant subunits from Lithuania, but political considerations prevented them admitting this. I repeat that we are concerned that the Defense Ministry is starting to pursue its own political line. In civilized countries it is (how can I put this mildly?) unusual for the military to do this.

[Krutikov] Are you prepared to agree to the existence of Soviet military bases on Lithuanian territory?

[Butkevicius] No proposals of this sort have been made to us. Furthermore, we do not have Russian long-term military installations on our territory. We have virtually nothing that could be turned into a military base. [Krutikov] Which units will be withdrawn first? [Butkevicius] The paratroopers stationed in the area around Vilnius will be the first to leave Lithuania.

[Krutikov] Minister, is a military threat from the East still a priority in Lithuania's defense strategy?

[Butkevicius] We have no priority threats. We are preparing to protect Lithuania's independence, and the Lithuanian Army will aim to protect the country regardless of whether we are threatened from the East or the West.

[Krutikov] Forgive me, minister, but has national defense not put pressure of a sort on the Lithuanian political leadership to speed up the withdrawal of the Russian troops?

[Butkevicius] That was the stance of the Russian Foreign Ministry, with which Saudargas only agreed, but no final documents were signed at the time at the foreign ministers' meeting in Moscow. As for national defense, we have not exerted any pressure, and we only proposed our schedule for the withdrawal of the troops. Incidentally, we were unpleasantly surprised once again when we found out that the Russian president saw the final text for the first time actually at the meeting with Mr. Landsbergis. Naturally, he wanted to make amendments to the document, and he made them directly on the final text. As a result, we had to agree that this document, like certain other political decisions, it still had work to be done on it.

Russian Airborne Regiment Withdrawal From Moldova on Schedule

*AU2309202992 Bucharest ROMPRES in English
1810 GMT 23 Sep 92*

[Text] Chisinau (ROMPRES) 23/9/1992—The withdrawal from the territory of the Republic of Moldova of the Russian 330d Airborne Regiment, headed by Colonel Lebed, younger brother of the Russian 14th Army commander General Lebed, and stipulated by an agreement between the Republic of Moldova and Russia, is proceeding normally, without incidents, according to the schedule—say military sources. The new station of the Russian regiment will be the town of Abakan, in Kazakhstan.

The first part of the regiment has already left the Republic of Moldova's capital city Chisinau. The greater part of the soldiers are already in Abakan, only about 120 conscripts are left in Chisinau besides the officers.

The second part of the regiment will carry away mainly its weaponry and equipment. The agreement stipulates that all the ammunition is to be left in Chisinau and the weaponry divided equally between the two sides.

Some of the officers and noncommissioned officers have decided to stay in Moldova, to work within the new brigade of motorized infantry of the Republic of Moldova's national Army, created to replace the Russian 330d Airborne.

Gromov Views Troop Withdrawal From Baltics

To Be 'Planned, Civilized'

*LD2409043092 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
1832 GMT 23 Sep 92*

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Andrey Naryshkin]

[Text] Moscow September 23 TASS—The withdrawal of the North-Western Group of Forces from the Baltic states shall and will have "a planned, civilized character", believes Deputy Russian Defence Minister Colonel-General Boris Gromov.

The Russian-Lithuanian protocol, envisaging the termination of re-location of Russian troops by the mid-1993, is not a "synonym of our readiness to run away". This is the only possible and acceptable compromise under current conditions, although the Lithuanian side has done nothing to enable Russia accept its conditions with satisfaction", he told ITAR-TASS today.

Commenting on the progress of the Russian-Lithuanian negotiations on military issues, Gromov noted the Defence Ministry on the basis of the Russian president's instruction and the actual situation in the region, has elaborated part of the documents on troops withdrawal from Lithuania, including the draft full-scale interstate agreement.

A supplement to this document, that has not been signed at the summit level, is a schedule of the Russian troops withdrawal. It was criticized at the Russian Supreme Soviet Committee on Defence and Security Issues. The Russian law-makers believe the Defence Ministry is already fulfilling the schedule, although the major agreement has not entered into force.

"I think the deputies should correctly estimate the situation around the Russian troops in the Baltics, including Lithuania," stressed the general.

"The matter is no new soldiers are recruited in the North- Western Group of Forces: Under the laws adopted by the Baltic states, the dispatch of any Russian military contingents, including those to replace dismissed servicemen, is prohibited.

"The natural consequence of this is the constant reduction of the Russian troops' strength on Baltic territory. After soldiers and sergeants are dismissed in fall, 1992, and spring, 1993, only officers and warrant officers will remain there.

"It is no secret they are on the verge of despair under the influence of the situation the Baltic authorities created around the Russian-speaking population, primarily, Russian servicemen.

"Bearing in mind these circumstances, it is hardly wise to insist on the delay of Russian troops withdrawal from Lithuania. At the same time, the Russian Defence Ministry and the government are doing their best that the Lithuanian side makes all compensations, primarily on the construction of housing for Russian servicemen, fully and in time, the general said.

Further on Remarks

*PM2509095792 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 25 Sep 92 p 1*

[Report on interview with Deputy Defense Minister Colonel General B. Gromov by ITAR-TASS correspondent Andrey Naryshkin; place, date not given: "Troop Withdrawal From the Baltics Must Be Civilized. Colonel General Boris Gromov, Russian Deputy Defense Minister, Comments on Course of Talks With Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia"]

[Text] The withdrawal of the Northwest Group of Forces units and formations from the Baltics must and will be "systematic and civilized," Russian Deputy Defense Minister Colonel General Boris Gromov thinks. The Russian-Lithuanian protocol which makes provision for our troops' redeployment to be completed by fall 1993 is "by no means synonymous with a readiness to flee." "This is the only possible compromise acceptable in the conditions that have taken shape, although the Lithuanian side did nothing to ensure that Russia accepted its terms with satisfaction," he said in an interview with your ITAR-TASS commentator.

Commenting on the course of the Russian-Lithuanian negotiating process on military matters, Boris Gromov pointed out that on the basis of the Russian president's ordinance and the real situation in the region, the Defense Ministry formulated some documents pertaining to the troop withdrawal from Lithuania, among them the draft of a full-scale interstate agreement. A Russian troop withdrawal schedule is one of the appendices to this document, which has not as yet been signed at summit level. It was recently criticized by the Russian Supreme Soviet Defense and Security Committee. Russian legislators pointed to the fact that the Defense Ministry is already putting the schedule into effect at a time when a basic agreement has not yet entered into force.

"I think that deputies should assess correctly the situation that has taken shape over Russian troops in the Baltic and, in particular, in Lithuania," General Gromov stressed. "The point is that the drafting of young replacements into the Northwest Group of Forces is being implemented in accordance with the laws adopted by the Baltic countries, and the dispatch of Russian troop contingents, including those to take the place of the number of troops discharged into the reserve, has been banned. The natural consequence of this is for the number of Russian troops to fall constantly. After enlisted men and NCO's [noncommissioned officers] who have done their prescribed term of service in the Baltics have been discharged this fall and next spring, only our officers and warrant officers will be left. It is no secret that they are already on the verge of despair under the pressure of the situation that the Baltic authorities have tried to create with regard to the Russian-speaking population and primarily with regard to Russian servicemen. In view of these circumstances it is foolish to insist on the deferral of the troop withdrawal from Lithuania."

What is more, the military leader pointed out, because of well-known circumstances, the Russian ground forces grouping in the Baltics is no longer performing the tasks it was set in the past. This does not apply to the Baltic Fleet, which is to preserve its presence in the region. General Gromov stressed that the Defense Ministry will press to ensure that the Russian Navy's most important strategic installations in the Baltics continue to function. On some positions, the leadership of these states has expressed its willingness to compromise.

At the request of your ITAR-TASS correspondent, Gromov specified the number of troops and military hardware to be redeployed to Russia, pointing out that there are roughly 35,000 Russian enlisted men and officers in Lithuania today, more than 15,000 in Latvia, and roughly 24,000 in Estonia. What is more, roughly 670 tanks, more than 1,500 armored fighting vehicles, and almost 400 aircraft and helicopters, along with roughly 700,000 tonnes of material resources and munitions are to be transferred to Russia. These figures give an idea of the colossal shipments that will have to be made over the next few years.

Nonetheless it is Boris Gromov's conviction that the most acute, painful question associated with our troops' departure from the Baltic is the question of the dates and conditions for the construction of housing for the families of officers and warrant officers without apartments, of whom there are roughly 7,500 in Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia today. In all, 56,000 Russian troops serving in units and formations to be withdrawn from our "close neighbors" do not have homes of their own today.

A compromise solution to this problem has already been found with the Lithuanian side. Russian servicemen's apartments will be sold at auction and the money obtained handed over to the former owners for housing construction in Russia. Agreements of this kind have not been reached with Estonia and Latvia, but we will firmly insist that they are secured, Colonel General Gromov noted. The Russian Defense Ministry and Government are doing all they can to ensure that the Baltic states provide the requisite compensation in full and on time. If this condition is not met, there can hardly be any serious talk about any progress in the talks and the status of and timetable for the withdrawal of our troops from the Baltic, he concluded.

Decommissioned Tanks Used for Scrap in Ukraine

*PM2909153992 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
24 Sep 92 Morning Edition p 1*

[UKRINFORM-TASS report: "Tanks to the Furnace"]

[Text] Nikolayev's "Vtorchermet" enterprise has embarked on mass breaking of armored personnel carriers and tanks from nearby military units as a result of the arms reduction program.

The Ukrainian furnaces will receive about 1,000 tonnes of scrap metal from combat vehicles before the end of the year. In order to interest the military in making regular deliveries of written-off hardware, the enterprise is paying them 1,500 rubles for every tonne of scrap metal turned in.

Russian Envoy Views Troop Withdrawal Talks With Latvia

Criticizes Latvian Stance

*PM2909085992 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
25 Sep 92 Morning Edition p 5*

[Report by Irina Litvinova: "Latvia and Russia Harden Their Positions at Talks"]

[Text] Riga—The latest round of Russian-Latvian talks (held in Jurmala) did, as always, proceed correctly but did not bring satisfaction to either side. Both delegations took rigid positions and did not make concessions.

The members of the government delegations and experts discussed economic, military, and humanitarian questions. If it had been possible to reach accords in principle on them, this would have brought nearer the signing of an entire package of agreements on specific problems. A report that the documents on the timing of the Russian troop withdrawal from Lithuania signed 8 September will evidently be annulled as not meeting Russia's interests—a report which appeared in the Latvian press on the second day of the delegation's work—was unexpected. The report did not add to the optimism of the Latvian side, which had intended to follow an equally speedy course on the troop withdrawal and named 1993 as the last year for the presence of Russian troops on its territory.

Border questions are also in an impasse. Russia submitted a draft interstate agreement on the border, which coincides with the border that separated the RSFSR and the Latvian Soviet Socialist Republic. Latvia confirmed its former position in a parliamentary resolution adopted on the eve of the talks: Proceeding from the peace treaty with Russia of 11 August 1920, it designates its own territory and its borders. Thus, Pskov Oblast's present Pytalovskiy Rayon must once again become the Abrene district, as recorded on new maps of the Republic of Latvia which have already been produced.

After the end of the talks Sergey Zotov, leader of the Russian delegation and ambassador at large, told IZVESTIYA's correspondent:

As is well known, in August Russia advanced initiatives which consisted in reducing the troop withdrawal time by five years—from the previously mentioned 1999 to 1994. In our view, this provided an opportunity for a breakthrough in the talks process. We had expected a responding step from the Latvian side.

Unfortunately, the Latvian side is not ready to travel its part of the path in search of compromises. What is more, Latvia has complained to the United Nations and asked for the question of the Russian troop withdrawal to be placed on the agenda of the General Assembly session. There is a noticeable desire to internationalize the problem of the Russian troop withdrawal. If this question really is included on the session agenda, the Russian side will have a moral right to suspend the talks, for our state finds it unacceptable to hold them under conditions of international pressure when discussing a strictly bilateral question.

Says Latvia 'Not Ready' for Talks

*LD2509171292 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
1421 GMT 25 Sep 92*

[By ITAR-TASS diplomatic correspondent Sergey Skripnikov]

[Text] Moscow September 25 TASS—Latvia is not ready yet for talks based on the complex approach towards the withdrawal of troops and other issues, including human

rights problems in Lithuania, approved by Russian President Boris Yeltsin and proposed by Russia on August 6, Sergey Zotov, head of the Russian delegation to the talks, said on Friday [25 September].

“Without real steps to change the legislation infringing upon political, economic and social rights of Russians, steps to create an atmosphere of good-neighbourly relations between all nationalities, without a firm denunciation of territorial claims to the bordering Russian lands, further talks will be no success,” Zotov said.

Among other questions raised by Russia, Zotov named welfare and legal guarantees for army personnel, retired military and their families, fair compensations for Russia's property left by the troops, inadmissibility of unilateral or discriminatory decisions against Russian troops at this stage, as well as Latvia's consent to replace army soldiers who have done their term of service without increasing Russian military presence in Latvia.

Zotov stressed that attempts to speed up “the withdrawal of troops from Latvia will be impossible without such a replacement of privates who load and guard military cargoes and hardware for transportation to Russia.”

The talks, which were held in Jurmala between September 22-24, will soon resume in Moscow.

Says Latvia Needs to Focus Position

*OW2809123792 Moscow BALTFAX in English
1129 GMT 28 Sep 92*

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] It hardly makes sense to have another meeting between Russian and Latvian state delegations before mid-October, according to Ambassador Sergey Zotov, the head of the Russian delegation. In an interview with BALTFAX, he noted that “the Latvian delegation, being unprepared to examine constructively Russia's suggestions, and having pulled out of talks this past March, that is, six months ago, should use the remaining time to determine its position and be ready to conduct a constructive dialogue.” The ambassador recalled that at the time of the bilateral talks held in Jurmala on 22-24 September, “regardless of the concessions made by the Russian side regarding the timetable for withdrawing its forces, and the suggestion to move the deadline up by five years (from 1999 to 1994), which was part of a Russian initiative proposed on 6 August, the Latvian delegation not only avoided studying the proposal, but in fact avoided discussing it at all.” Mr. Zotov also said that the Russian side cannot fail to take into consideration that until now, no clear notification has been received regarding the rejection of border claims involving Russian lands; and that no indication has been made of Latvia's readiness to conduct negotiations on the drawing of boundaries based on a Latvian plan for an inter-governmental agreement.

The Russian diplomat said that in order to prepare for the next meeting, a longer hiatus would be needed than was proposed by the Latvians; he also emphasized that the most important thing was to have more discussion of all the issues with the goal of finding mutually acceptable solutions, rather than again becoming fixated on existing disagreements.

The Latvian delegation had proposed holding another round of talks next week in Moscow.

Ukrainian Envoy Reports to CFE Consultative Group

LD2709155292 Kiev Radio Ukraine World Service in Ukrainian 2200 GMT 25 Sep 92

[Text] As reported by the information section of the Foreign Ministry of Ukraine, a routine session of the joint consultative group, created to implement the treaty on reducing conventional armed forces in Europe [CFE], opened on the 23 September in the Vienna Hofburg Palace. Speaking at the meeting Ambassador Kostenko, head of the Ukrainian delegation at the Vienna negotiations on security and cooperation in Europe, reported in detail about Ukraine's implementation of the provisions of this important military and political treaty, and about the beginning of the destruction and the re-equipping of military hardware for national economic purposes.

Belarusian Plant To Scrap About 2,000 Old Tanks

OW2809125092 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1125 GMT 28 Sep 92

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] The repair plant located in the Belarusian city of Borisov has begun reconstruction works with a view to scrapping military equipment subject to reduction.

As IF [INTERFAX]'s correspondent learned at the Defence Ministry in Minsk, about 2,000 tanks of old models plus more than 1,000 armoured vehicles and other military equipment are to be scrapped between next February and June of 1996.

NUCLEAR TESTING

Future of Novaya Zemlya Test Range Examined

PM2309150792 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 19 Sep 92 pp 1,2

[Oleg Falichev report: "Novaya Zemlya Testing Range: Two Years of Silence. But What About Nevada?"]

[Excerpts] Novaya Zemlya-Moscow—As already announced, a mixed commission led by Army General P. Grachev, Russian defense minister, and V. Mikhaylov, minister of atomic energy, was at work on Novaya Zemlya 16-17 September.

Novaya Zemlya... A year ago there was more than enough hullabaloo over this place. To be more precise, over the nuclear test range there. Some newspapers eagerly reported fish without scales, bald reindeer, and high radiation levels.... Although the "facts," so to speak, necessitated careful checks, a wave of radiophobia swamped the islands of common sense. All the work at the test ground connected with preparing and carrying out tests was suspended. And Russia unilaterally announced a year's moratorium on nuclear explosions. [passage omitted]

In the past year something else has also become clear: Russia's appeal for a universal ban on nuclear tests has remained a voice in the wilderness. France alone has made some response to it. While the United States has detonated and is still detonating nuclear weapons. And it is not the only one. The following picture has emerged in the 1985-1992 period: Nevada—98, Mururoa—52, Semipalatinsk—41, Novaya Zemlya—four, Lop Nor (China)—five. In 1992 the United States has already carried out four tests (while China has carried out one).

Why are the Americans continuing testing so doggedly? First, I think, they are less subject to the influence of public opinion than we are. They have developed a test program for many years that is being rigorously implemented and is not very dependent on the vagaries of the current political situation. It performs civil, if you like, economic tasks as well as military tasks. I am referring to the Americans' secret work to develop a thermonuclear capsule—the prototype for a 21st-century nuclear reactor—which cannot be developed without full-scale tests. If they resolve this problem, they will safeguard themselves in the future from power crises for a long time.

Second, there are fairly clear grounds for all the tests carried out in the Pentagon's interests. (Although they certainly do not explain and reveal everything). For instance, at a session of the NATO Nuclear Planning Group, U.S. Defense Minister R. Cheney said the following on this subject: "Nuclear arsenals that undergo tests are more reliable than arsenals that do not."

An unexpected idea occurs to me. Is it the case that, by not testing our nuclear weapons, we now pose a greater threat to the world than the United States? One can hardly agree with that. Especially as both countries have sufficient statistical experience to enable us to avoid accidents and mistakes here. It looks as though this explanation is only needed "there" for public consumption and to annually extract \$400-450 million for the upkeep of the test range. Which can then quite calmly be spent on purely military programs, SDI, say. God grant that I am mistaken, but there are many indications to the contrary....

How do we look against this backdrop? You get the impression that we are continuing to remain euphoric over the proposals put forward in the past—bold proposals that nonetheless failed to meet with a response.

Army General P. Grachev, Russian defense minister, and the members of the commission heard the opinions voiced by scientific representatives and the command of the test site.

"In this time we have lost many skilled cadres and jeopardized scientific programs," Captain First Rank V. Lepskiy, head of the test site's research unit, thinks. "And it is very hard to repair omissions." [passage omitted]

During the visit to Novaya Zemlya, Army General P. Grachev, Russian defense minister; V. Mikhaylov, Russian minister of atomic energy; and P. Bolakshin, Arkhangelsk Oblast administration head, inquired about the life and living conditions of the archipelago's military and civilian populations. Many problems have been solved on site. In particular, cadre issues and problems pertaining to provision of motorized tractor and aviation equipment. Others will be resolved in the near future.

One last point. In these comments I have voiced my personal opinion regarding the need for the test range. It is up to the country's leadership to decide its real future. One thing is clear: If we want Russia to be a great state, we must think and act in a manner that befits a state.

Defense Minister Grachev Visits Novaya Zemlya

*PM2209130992 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA
PRAVDA in Russian 22 Sep 92 p 1*

[Report by V. Karkavtsev under the "Facts Alone" rubric: "Visits"]

[Text] Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev and Viktor Mikhaylov, Russian minister of atomic energy and industry, paid a one-day visit to Novaya Zemlya. There they examined issues pertaining to reducing the number of servicemen and units based at the nuclear test site and possibly transferring them to the mainland.

However, preparations for the next tests are going ahead here at full speed.

Commentary on U.S. Nuclear Testing Position

*LD2409155192 Moscow Radio Moscow World Service
in English 1429 GMT 24 Sep 92*

[Commentary by Yuriy Solton]

[Text] The United States has hastened to complete the programme of nuclear tests planned for the 1992 fiscal year ending on 30th September. The Nevada testing ground has seen two underground nuclear blasts over the past six days. The administration has turned a deaf ear to the US Congress's calls to introduce a nuclear moratorium for a term of between nine to 12 months and terminate nuclear explosions by 1996.

Neither the Energy Department, responsible for the programme, nor the Pentagon itself notified the Congress, even preliminarily, as has usually been the practice before. Administration officials allege that the United States needs nuclear testing to check the safety, reliability and effectiveness of nuclear weapons but that is, of course, only part of the truth. Military experts have calculated that after the American atomic bombardment of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945, the nuclear powers have staged more than 1,900 tests with some 85 per cent of all the nuclear explosions planned to perfect nuclear forces. Even today, the Pentagon admits that the blasts in Nevada are not essential to develop more sophisticated nuclear weapons but such a programme hardly matches the process underway in the United States and Russia to slash their nuclear arsenals. It also undermines the nuclear non-proliferation regime; one of the most pressing problems today.

The new varieties of nuclear warheads being designed cost less and are simpler to produce and handle. But there is yet another factor to consider. The continuation of American nuclear tests may trigger off a chain reaction. When China exploded its nuclear device last summer it immediately declared that it favoured the total termination of nuclear testing. France has joined Russia's nuclear moratorium, the terms of which, however, expire on 1st October.

Russia's leadership has received quite a few requests from public activists in independent Commonwealth and other countries to continue the nuclear moratorium. Not long ago, such an appeal was addressed to it and to the US administration by eminent scientists and politicians from the 50 countries participating in the Pugwash Conference. Moscow is ready to favourably respond to these appeals, provided the other nuclear club members do the same. But in Russia there is an influential group amongst the military, politicians and scientists, who argue that such a long pause in testing, two years now, when other countries have continued tests and that consequently Russia's government has put its national security seriously at risk [sentence as heard].

It cannot be ruled out that a decision to resume nuclear explosions will be adopted. The fate of a total nuclear test ban, which Moscow and the overwhelming majority of other UN member countries have advocated for so long, will much depend on whether Washington and London change their positions or not.

Grachev, Mikhaylov Criticize U.S. Nuclear Tests

*PM2909121592 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
25 Sep 92 Morning Edition p 2*

[Report by Nikolay Burbyga: "Inspection in Novaya Zemlya"]

[Text] A mixed commission headed by Army General Pavel Grachev, Russian minister of defense, and by Viktor Mikhaylov, minister of atomic energy, has been to the "Novaya Zemlya" test site.

What is the site's fate to be? In P. Grachev's opinion, it is necessary to preserve what was created earlier, because Russia cannot afford new construction today, and the site's old buildings are in need of significant repairs. As for the moratorium on nuclear explosions announced unilaterally by Russia last year, it is coming to an end.

"Unfortunately, none but the French have subscribed to it," Grachev said. "While in the United States, I put a question to Mr. Cheney, the defense secretary. The French and we have established a moratorium, I said, but you are carrying out explosions. For what purposes? Are you improving nuclear weapons? 'No,' he replied. 'Explosions are continuing so that personnel do not lose their skills, so as to check the reliability of the storage of nuclear munitions.'"

The pace of tests on the world's nuclear sites has not changed in any way from 1985 through 1992. Here are the figures: Nevada 98, Mururoa 52, Novaya Zemlya four, Lop Nor (China) five. In 1992 alone the United States has already conducted four tests.

Why do the Americans cling so stubbornly to nuclear tests? There are several reasons, Atomic Energy Minister Viktor Mikhaylov believes. First, the Americans are carrying out a nuclear test program lasting many years, which tackles not only military but also economic tasks in the interests of all of society. Second, they are less amenable to the influence of public opinion when it is a question of national interests.

CHEMICAL & BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

Official Denies Report on Chemical Weapons

*LD1809103592 Moscow Radio Rossii Network
in Russian 0900 GMT 18 Sep 92*

[Text] Russia strictly observes the provisions of the Geneva convention and other international agreements on chemical weapons. Moreover, the Russian side has not violated by any of its actions even draft agreements in this area, nor has it infringed on its bilateral accords with the United States concerning toxic substances used for military purposes.

A statement to this effect was made to an ITAR-TASS correspondent by a high-ranking official of Russia's Defense Ministry who wished to remain anonymous. He described as an irresponsible fabrication a publication in the American newspaper THE BALTIMORE SUN on 16 September that claims, quoting sources in Moscow, that Russia has allegedly developed a new type of nerve gas, and even tested it in January this year.

USSR BW Programs, Treaty Violations Viewed

*924P0184A Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 19 Sep 92 p 3*

[Article by V. Umnov: "KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA Investigation: The Danger of a Biological War Remains"]

[Text] Despite international agreements, presidential ukases, and resolutions of parliaments, the system which has created biological weapons still has not been destroyed in Russia. Therefore, the danger of a biological war remains.

To Whom Do the Ukases and Resolutions Not Apply?

In early September, official representatives of the Governments of Russia, Great Britain, and the United States met in Moscow and adopted a joint statement on biological weapons. For the first time the Russian side officially admitted that until March 1992 we had violated the Convention on the Prohibition of Biological Weapons, which the USSR ratified in 1975.

"According to the current official version, our programs in the area of biological weapons began in 1946... At issue was so-called offensive research, to which the ukase of the president of Russia dated 11 April 1992 put an end...

"The directorate responsible for the offensive biological program in the Ministry of Defense was eliminated; the dismantling of experimental production lines for 'biological formulations' and the closure of a facility for biological weapons testing..., a 50 percent reduction of staff involved in military biological programs and a 30 percent cutback in funding were announced."

NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA, 15 September 1992

All the tricks which the representatives of military settlement 19 in Yekaterinburg resorted to as recently as several months ago were reduced to nought overnight: In 1979 an outbreak of anthrax occurred there (see the article "If I Am Found Unconscious, Please Inform the City of Sverdlovsk..." KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA, 10 June 1992).

Overnight, the falsehood of what we had been hearing for a year from military men of different ranks was revealed; they had not allowed KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA journalists to visit the biological testing grounds on Vozrozhdeniya Island in the Sea of Aral, in Kazakhstan (see the article "Soviet Germs Started Talking After 20 Years of Silence" in KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA, 30 April 1992).

Both the testing grounds and four divisions of the Central Institute of Microbiology of the Armed Forces of Russia have now been closed. One might think that the history of Soviet biological weapons has come to an end...

However, I just cannot understand why even this time the Russian officials were afraid to speak the whole truth? Could they really have heard nothing about the civilian "front" of the military program, the "Ogarkov system" (so called by those in the know, based on the name of its first chief, General Vsevolod Ivanovich Ogarkov)?

"Geoffrey Smith wrote in an article published on the front page of THE WASHINGTON POST on 31 August: 'The

United States and Great Britain are concerned about the fact that the Government of Russia is probably failing to keep the promise it gave half a year ago to discontinue the Soviet program for creating prohibited bacteriological weapons...

"According to data from American representatives, the inability to submit a detailed report on the Soviet Union's long-term use of the civilian pharmaceutical complex Biopreparat as a screen for a secret military biological program constitutes Russia's most serious violation of the obligations it assumed."

IZVESTIYA, 31 August 1992

Are There Limits to State Secrets?

Everyone I happened to talk to about this secret had signed secrecy pledges in their time, when they were hired and when they quit. Despite the death of the USSR, the old laws technically apply in the area of guarding state secrets. Were I to name the names of my interlocutors I would have them incur the wrath of cumbersome legislation, whether I like it or not.

The main point is that these people have started talking.

For now, I dare to maintain that the publication of this information by no means affects state security but merely reveals unseemly departmental secrets, of which we have accumulated an overabundance in 70 years. These facts do not amount to divulging state secrets for the simple reason that the information, the concealment of which violates constitutional and legislative rights of citizens, jeopardizes their personal security, impairs their health, and entails dangerous consequences for the ecological situation, may not constitute a state secret (this is also confirmed by Resolution No. 220 of the Government of Russia, dated 2 April 1992, "Issues of Organizing the Protection of State Secrets of the Russian Federation," which for some reason was not intended for publication either). Otherwise, what kind of a state is it?

How We Took the Uniforms Off

The "Ogarkov system" was set up in 1973 by a resolution of the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers. It has since changed names repeatedly: the All-Union Research and Production Association Biopreparat, the Special Directorate of the Main Administration of Microbiological Industry, P.O. Box A-1063, the Main Directorate Biopreparat of the USSR Ministry of Medical Industry, and the State Concern Biopreparat. To keep the further narration brief, it will just be referred to as "the System."

What was the true reason for the isolated, special-security System with strictly military tasks to be established within a civilian department?

Could it be that the foreign policy climate changed, the Union had just signed the convention, and it became awkward for the military to work on this problem?

Could it be that the adversary "figured out" the biological enterprises of the Ministry of Defense, which were managed by Colonel General Yefim Ivanovich Smirnov, a former USSR minister of health, despite it being mentioned in the well-known book by N. Yakovlev "The CIA Against the USSR" that he "switched from a military uniform to a civilian suit... in 1947"? It turns out that he did not switch, and until his last days led a directorate of the Ministry of Defense, the "customer" of the System.

Technical and scientific documentation was transferred to the System from the Ministry of Defense. Several operating plants were assigned, and it was planned to establish a bacteriological center in Obolensk, near Moscow, and a virus research center in Koltsovo, near Novosibirsk. Two enterprises in Vilnius were added. The latter had nothing at all to do with special programs; they were cover, pure and simple.

New positions opened up in managerial structures which were called upon to take care of the System: in the CPSU Central Committee Department of the Chemical Industry, Council of Ministers, State Committee for Material and Technical Supply, State Planning Committee, KGB, Ministry of Health, Procuracy... The sensitivity of the task being accomplished called for secrecy, isolation, and life according to rules all their own. At the same time, it ensured a lack of control over the leaders of the System.

Random individuals virtually did not end up there. It was easier to ensure that the secrets be kept in a circle of professional dynasties, among acquaintances and relatives. In addition there were decent salaries, higher than even at most defense enterprises.

Officers on loan, who had gained experience at the biological facilities of the Ministry of Defense, were the backbone of the personnel. They not only managed research and development but also maintained, in a planned manner, the following conviction in the minds of civilians: They were carrying out a program to develop preparations for defending the army and the population against weapons of mass destruction.

Against Whom May Biological Weapons Be Used?

Let us look at it soberly: What sense did it make to spend loads of money to perfect biological weapons while much more powerful, "effective," if you will, nuclear weapons were being developed?

The first scenario: The Union developed them for offensive purposes.

As is known, the dynamics of modern warfare do not make it possible to use biological weapons against enemy troops in a tactical role. Could they be used against the civilian population? How can we shrug off assurances by Polish journalists that Soviet-produced chemical warfare agents were used against miners from that state who

went on strike at a coal face, responding to an appeal by Solidarity, which was still underground then?..

In the prewar years there was even a specialist in our country who developed subversive methods for the use of biological weapons—you enter the subway carrying a special knapsack, and...

The second scenario: The scientists of the country were developing an "antidote" against the biological weapons of the adversary.

"From the point of view of independent experts such arguments cannot stand up to criticism if for no other reason than that it is impossible to vaccinate the entire population against an incredibly large number of illnesses. However, if it is impossible to ensure protection for the civilian population, then does it make sense to develop an 'antidote'?"

IZVESTIYA, 22 October 1987.

Please note: This quote counters the arguments of a "cornered Pentagon representative," and not at all those of the Soviet military. Why should we not apply this quote to ourselves?

Finally, if the strain which the enemy would dump on friendly residents were known, it would suffice to outfit a small laboratory, for example, that of a medical college, with airtight equipment and generate the necessary amount of "biomass" to fill several bombs.

Is this to say that the idea itself was absurd, just a bluff?

Or was it a feeding trough? They say that new continuous production lines designed by Biokhimashproekt [expansion not identified] were commissioned with difficulty: They did not perform as they were supposed to. Nonetheless, the equipment was accepted (after all, funds had been spent!), and, some time later, written off.

Nobody engaged in the mass production of biological weapons in our country. However, a mobilization assignment existed (it may still exist because, at present, a mobilization department in the Biopreparat concern remains). This is a plan stating what amounts of specifically which combat formulations must be generated when the command is given. Production could begin within mere months.

The equipment was mothballed in special shops (as a rule, operating biochemical production facilities were used). Such shops were idle at the Berdsk and Omutninsk Chemical Plants and the Progress Plant in Stepnogorsk. In addition, there was a plant within the organization of the Ministry of Agriculture and two plants within the Ministry of Health.

Until the beginning of the 1980's the System developed, grew stronger, and guzzled up billions of rubles.

When Biopreparat Began To Go Under

The beginning of the disintegration of the "Ogarkov system" in the late 1980's coincided with the failure of Vladimir Artemyevich Pasechnik, the director of the Leningrad Institute of High Purity Preparations, to return from a business trip abroad. He was a well-known scientist. In particular, following his denunciations, talk began of mutual international inspections of biological facilities. They decided that it was time to wind down.

"...how can the presence of biological weapons be controlled if a couple of glasses with bacteria are comparable, in terms of their lethal effect, to 5 tonnes of nerve gas or 100 tonnes of potassium cyanide? Extensive warehouses which could be detected with the aid of satellites are not needed to store biological weapons."

PRAVDA, 11 April 1989

Not long before Pasechnik's defection they planned to set up new plants, one of them somewhere in Siberia. They changed their minds. The special equipment in the mothballed shops, which could indicate that the manufacturing of special products was being readied there, was shipped out. Some of it was destroyed; the most valuable equipment was hidden in regular metal containers at unknown locations. We hope that it is no longer possible to restore the shops...

Documents and the last remaining papers were destroyed at the end of last year or even early this year.

International inspectors visited in 1989. Prior to the visit, employees at the facilities received instructions on what might be said, and what should be said. Apparently, all of it became clear to the inspectors, anyhow.

What Is Biopreparat Like Today?

Imagine this: It has survived! At present it is called a state concern; this is a purely managerial structure with about 150 people, a small ministry which has always carried on independently of the structure to which it technically belonged. By an ukase of the president of Russia, dated 5 December 1991, it was transferred to the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Health of Russia.

"An inspection made by us established that this concern was not registered through established procedures and may not be recognized as a legal entity..."

(From a letter by the chief of the Directorate of Justice of Moscow to the mayor of the capital city).

The System demands funding from the budget, and it is provided, "including in freely convertible currency" (resolution of the Supreme Soviet of Russia No. 3244-1, dated 8 July 1992).

The System seeks to obtain assignments for the national economy, and successfully fails to accomplish them. This was the case with, for example, organizing the production of a diagnostic test for the AIDS virus at one of its

facilities, the Vektor scientific and production association, and with another institute, the Scientific Research Institute of Applied Microbiology in Obolensk near Moscow, performing the functions of the coordinating organization for biological means of plant protection (see the article "Pinpoint Action Plague" in KOMSO-MOLSKAYA PRAVDA, 24 September 1991).

This is happening at a time when the genuine pharmaceutical industry of the country is falling apart. The System just does not have, nor has it ever had, such specialists. Why did it not occur to anyone that it is simpler and more useful to invest funds in organizations which professionally develop and produce drugs, for example, the previously mentioned vaccines?

Specialists estimate very liberally that about five percent of the potential of Biopreparat may be used for civilian purposes. There were more developments for civilian use even within the Ministry of Defense structure, which has now ceased to exist. For example, it was precisely there that excellent vaccines were developed for anthrax and tetanus. To be sure, according to my information, they never reached the "civilians."

Within Biopreparat such projects were on the books, and were even well funded. However, what was actually produced? A flu vaccine at the Omutninsk Chemical Plant. However, this was a purely diversionary job; the vaccine was developed by the Ministry of Health. Besides, some accomplishments of basic research may be taken advantage of for peaceful purposes one day...

How did the entire System manage to survive? It is very difficult for the System to compete. The Biomash scientific and production association has debts amounting to 20 million rubles. This must also be the case at other institutes. Therefore, economics is not a factor. Could it be personal connections? One of the leaders of a Central Committee subdepartment is currently a deputy general director of the Biomash scientific and production association. All those who previously managed and supervised have been reshuffled and have found jobs somewhere. Why would they torpedo their System?

The System is becoming accustomed to the new economic conditions. It is preparing for conversion to joint-stock operations and hoping to retain control of the same enterprises. Emissaries from the center who speak at the meetings of labor collectives persistently urge that the hierarchical structure of the System be maintained in the course of privatization.

However, do you understand that this is not the whole problem yet? Each of these enterprises may operate on its own. Why are they trying to preserve dangerous old ties? It would be too reckless to neglect the danger of the resumption of work on the creation of biological weapons as long as the System is, through camouflage, preserved as an integrated entity, as long as the "organizers" who just yesterday planned and steered topics in the area of creating such weapons hold management

positions, and, finally, as long as the mobilization department operates within the management staff of the System.

In spring a committee for convention-related problems of chemical and biological weapons was established under the president of Russia. It would appear that this was precisely the place to become concerned about this danger. To be sure, there is a "but": The committee is headed by Colonel General Anatoliy Demyanovich Kuntsevich, who is considered to be the most prominent specialist on chemical weapons, and who began his scientific career at a well-known facility at Shikhany...

Is It Possible to Kill the System?

"The Far North of Yakutia is facing a horrible threat: Specialists fear an outbreak of smallpox, a terrible disease whose complete elimination the physicians of our country announced as long ago as 11 years..."

"However, this is what is frightening: The smallpox virus is capable of surviving for inconceivably long periods of time. At present, specialists from... the Vektor scientific and production association from Novosibirsk are working in the area of the cemetery."

ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA, 3 April 1991

The Biopreparat concern is still housed in the mansion of the former owner of alcohol distilleries, Smirnov, in Moscow. It is still run by a general. The facility is guarded, just as before, by warrant officers of the internal troops, with their special training and guns in shoulder harnesses. The Vektor scientific and production association is a cog in the machine of the "Ogarkov system."

Official Examines Destruction of CBW Weapons

PM2309144592 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI
in Russian 22 Sep 92 p 2

[Interview with academician Anatoliy Kuntsevich, chairman of the Russian Federation President's Committee for Problems of Chemical and Biological Weapons Conventions, by Lev Chernenko; place, date not given: "In Order To Live We Should Destroy the Deadly Weapons Stockpiles"—first paragraph is ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI introduction]

[Text] The biological substances that secret laboratories developed for military purposes in the former USSR in contravention of the international convention can cause anthrax, botulism, and other terrible, fatal illnesses. But what is the situation today? Academician Anatoliy Kuntsevich, chairman of the Russian Federation president's Committee for Problems of Chemical and Biological Weapons Conventions, answers questions from a ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI correspondent.

[Chernenko] Anatoliy Demyanovich, what has caused the West's concern in connection with Russia's compliance with the Convention on Biological Weapons? Are there grounds for this?

[Kuntsevich] There are in fact no grounds for this, though there were legal problems. The point is that after the Convention on Biological Weapons was signed in 1972, the United States and Great Britain adopted special laws forbidding the development and implementation of offensive programs in this area which also stipulate definite accountability for such infringements. Having ratified the convention in 1975, the USSR did not adopt any such laws. It is only now after our committee has been formed that we, in analyzing the legal situation that has developed in this area, have come to the conclusion that it is necessary that we, too, adopt the appropriate legislative documents. As a result, the Russian Federation president's decree on guaranteeing that we discharge our international obligations in the area of biological weapons was recently issued, and the corresponding law is in preparation. In this way, having destroyed the research and production base of the offensive programs, we have created a legal basis which precludes their revival.

[Chernenko] So it turns out that it has taken us almost 20 years first of all to finally admit our violations in plain terms, and then to carry out the international convention's demands in their entirety...

[Kuntsevich] Indeed, these clear violations on the convention were only admitted after the totalitarian regime collapsed and duplicity in politics was abandoned. We admitted that after the convention was ratified, the offensive programs in the area of biological warfare were not immediately curtailed, research in this area continued, tests were carried out, and production went on. Methods of preparing biological agents for military purposes and methods of delivering them, using aircraft and missile munitions, were developed in one St. Petersburg institute and at three military facilities in Kirov, Yekaterinburg, and Sergiyev Posad. Tests were carried out at the test site situated on the island of Vozrozhdeniye in the Aral Sea.

[Chernenko] Was the outbreak of anthrax in Sverdlovsk [renamed Yekaterinburg] in 1979 linked to the activities of one of these facilities?

[Kuntsevich] There was indeed a military facility in this city which among other things worked on methods of preparing anthrax. But the pattern of events that occurred at Sverdlovsk cannot be unequivocally linked to the scenario of a putative accident at the facility. It should have left characteristic traces and had fairly clearly defined near and distant infection zones. But nothing of the kind occurred. In the military facility's settlement, which in the case of an accident would inevitably have fallen within the near infection zone, there were no cases of illness. The experts advance various scenarios for what happened. Before coming to

any unequivocal conclusion, they should all be studied exhaustively. Our committee plans to carry out this work in the future.

[Chernenko] Does this military facility continue to exist in Yekaterinburg at the moment? And what in general is the fate of such facilities today?

[Kuntsevich] This facility, like similar centers in Kirov and Sergiyev Posad, are now only working on creating means of protection against biological weapons. It should be mentioned that our protective means of this kind are fairly competitive. It is no accident that during the war in the Persian Gulf when there were fears that Iraq might use biological weapons, we received offers from the West to buy up our protective means.

Apart from the protective means, the facilities are today engaged in developing new highly effective medicines. Having invested our scientists and specialists' efforts in this, we are preserving a great intellectual and scientific and technical asset. You have to admit that finding solutions to military questions in the area of microbiology gave great impetus to the development of this fundamental science and lead to a leading civilian sector being formed. Now that the equipment has been completely dismantled and the resources that previously were used for military purposes have been destroyed, there are no problems with changing these facilities' line of specialization to produce medical preparations.

The first palpable move toward such conversion, toward the offensive programs finally being wound down, was made in 1985 when it was proposed that the Soviet Union present a report to the United Nations on its compliance with the convention. At this time research also began to be wound down, and the equipment for producing biological preparations began to be dismantled. But this winding down process went on for several years. The remnants of the offensive programs in the area of biological weapons were still around as recently as 1991. It was only in 1992 that Russia absolutely stopped this work.

[Chernenko] What measures have been taken to this end? What proof can we present to the world's public?

[Kuntsevich] We have already been talking about measures of a legal nature: A presidential decree has been issued and a law is in preparation. Within the Russian Defense Ministry's structure the relevant directorate has been abolished and a directorate for radiological, chemical, and biological protection has been set up. Finance for work even in the sphere of protective means has been reduced by 30 percent; personnel employed in this area has been reduced by 50 percent. The test site on the island of Vozrozhdeniye in the Aral Sea has been destroyed. Incidentally, specialists judge that the ecological situation on this island is normal. Now birds and other animals are settling there. You see every animal is in its own way a means of ecological monitoring. Of course, after destroying such a facility, the Ministry of

Defense ought to hand over the test range's land in perfect order. This work is now in progress.

[Chernenko] But how are the stockpiles of biological weapons going to be destroyed?

[Kuntsevich] We did not have stockpiles of biological weapons. The point is that they cannot be kept for a long time. Therefore, the question of their destruction does not come up.

[Chernenko] Are measures for international monitoring of whether the convention is being complied with envisaged?

[Kuntsevich] Yes, the foreign experts can also satisfy themselves that the convention's conditions are being observed. For example, the president directed our experts to check one institute in St. Petersburg together with foreign specialists. We made the proposal to our foreign colleagues that they also visit other of our facilities, take away samples, take photographs, and shoot films. Of course on a mutual basis—our experts should receive the same rights in respect of similar foreign facilities. We are also proposing to form joint working groups including Russian and foreign experts. Another direction we are moving in is to give the scientific and production potential a new direction, moving away from military tasks toward civilian purposes. In our view there are great opportunities here for Russian-American cooperation, for joint projects.

[Chernenko] Yes, of course, it is necessary to think how to use the potential that is being made available. After all, specialists in biological weapons, once they have lost their jobs, may receive tempting offers, for example, from "third world" countries. How likely is it that there will be a "brain drain" in this area?

[Kuntsevich] There is no such phenomenon as a "brain drain," of course. But earlier, when military tasks were being carried out at our facilities, there were "defectors"—scientists and specialists who fled to the West. Incidentally, they exaggerated our potential a lot in the area of biological weapons in order to bump up their price. For example, in 1989 a certain Pasechnik, who was director of a St. Petersburg institute, fled to the West. He made up a lot in order to show how important he was. We are now suggesting to our Western colleagues that Pasechnik come with them to his old institute and show us what he made up. He did, of course, know a thing or two, but he invented a lot in order to bump up his price. This case is, of course, a throwback to the "cold war." We should build our relations today on another basis, on that of cooperation and trust.

[Chernenko] Biological weapons are now banned. The international convention has made them illegal. But as far as chemical weapons are concerned, a convention has not to date been adopted...

[Kuntsevich] Yes, work on this convention, in which we have been taking an active part, has already been going on for 20 years. Just recently its final version was

completed and has been sent to the United Nations. The Convention on Chemical Weapons will be available for signing in Paris beginning in January 1993. Russia supports this important international document, whose adoption is putting in motion a mechanism for destroying chemical weapons and one for monitoring this process.

[Chernenko] How many of these weapons will we have to destroy? How are we going to do this, if we take into consideration that the plant in Chapayevsk, which was specially built for such purposes, has changed its line of specialization under public pressure?

[Kuntsevich] We will have to destroy 40,000 tonnes of poisonous substances. This will take 10 years. Yes, the Chapayevsk plant has changed its line of specialization; an educational and training center based on it has been created which prepares specialists in the destruction of chemical weapons. But how can this work to destroy them be carried out? Our committee put forward this method to the president, which, incidentally, the convention stipulates: to change the line of specialization of facilities that previously were producing chemical weapons so that they destroy them. Here the principle is as follows: He who produced the chemical weapons should also destroy them. That is, this matter should be exclusively in the hands of professionals.

[Chernenko] But where will these facilities be located?

[Kuntsevich] There are such plants in Cheboksary, Volgograd, and Dzerzhinsk. What is more the Cheboksary plant already has the technology to destroy them now—this capability was previously there to destroy poisonous substances in a "poor condition." There are also old, in part even prewar, stockpiles of poisonous substances—of mustard gas and lewisite—in Russia. They are kept in large quantities in the settlements of Gornyy in Saratov Oblast and Kambarka in Udmurtia. It is also best of all to destroy them on the spot. The methods that we propose to use to destroy the poisonous substances are harmless and ecologically safe.

[Chernenko] The committee that you head is a very unusual organization which does not have any parallels in the past. What does its role consist of?

[Kuntsevich] It is our committee's duty to provide the highest authority in Russia in the area of carrying out the convention. For this we have been given great powers for monitoring the activities of the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Industry, and the Ministry of Health. The other side of our activities is to carry our inspections abroad. The level of the inspectors' training should allow them to carry out a highly professional, and painstaking analysis of similar foreign facilities in order to satisfy themselves 100 percent that our partners are carrying out their obligations just as strictly.

Plans Ready for Destruction of Chemical Weapons

PM2509093792 IZVESTIYA in Russian
23 Sep 92 Morning Edition p 2

[Article by Viktor Litovkin: "Destruction of Chemical Weapons Could Make Russia Rich"]

[Text] Preparations have been completed for stage one of the program to destroy chemical weapons in Russia. It will be discussed at a government session and at the Supreme Soviet.

The total cost of the program will be 3.334 billion rubles [R] in 1991 prices. It was devised by the Committee on Chemical and Biological Weapons Convention Problems under the Russian president, the Academy of Sciences, the ministries of defense, security, economics, industry, finance, ecology, and communications, and other interested departments.

At stage one the plan is to make three facilities fully operational. They will destroy 45 percent of all Russian chemical agents. That is 7,000 tonnes of lewisite, mustard gas, and lewisite-mustard gas mixture, some of which the country has been storing ever since World War I and which are to be found in the settlement of Gornyy, Saratov Oblast, and also in the city of Kambarka, Udmurt Republic. Moreover, at one of the plants, a former producer of chemical weapons, the destruction of 3.5 million projectiles will be organized.

How will it be done? The concept elaborated by Academicians A. Kuntsevich, O. Nefedov, Zh. Alferov, G. Devyatikh, and other eminent scientists demands that lewisite be regarded as a national raw material resource and that it be processed into a raw material of strategic value to microelectronics—extremely pure arsenic. The kind that could be used for home production and for sale on the world market. The price of it there hovers around \$2,000 per kg.

The Russian State Scientific Research Institute of Chemical Technology (formerly GSNIIOKhT) has taken the lead in the open competition for the best lewisite processing technology. It offered the most effective and safest, "wet" method of preliminary neutralization of lewisite with an alkali, and subsequent electrolysis of the reaction products. This method gives off no gas, there are no furnaces involved, and nothing is burned. There is practically no effect on the environment.

In second, third, and fourth places you have the techniques proposed by the branch of the Karpov Physical Chemistry Institute in Obninsk, a scientific research institute in Nizhny Novgorod, and the Institute of Chemical Technology again, which devised, as a second option, a method of chlorinating lewisite.

The competition for the best technique continues. Scientists and industrialists from other states can participate. The results were recently discussed by a Russian

scientists' conference at the Academy of Sciences Institute of Chemical Physics, and a similar international conference is planned for next year.

"The Russian-American agreement states that our experts will examine all the proposals, irrespective of state or national origin," Academician Anatoliy Kuntsevich, chairman of the concept committee, said.

The intention is to pay the winners in rubles and hard currency. They will be selected with the participation of the population, the public and authorities of the places where it is proposed to construct the chemical agent processing facilities. They will have guaranteed access to all the materials and documents and an equal vote when approving the final decision. Incidentally, there is a provision whereby regional businesspeople and working people at the enterprises involved in destroying chemical weapons will receive a share of the profits from the processing of them.

The mustard gas is also to be processed, after detoxification, into reaction products which can be used, for example, in the rubber industry, to accelerate the vulcanization of rubber. Corrosion-resistant, fireproof compounds to treat cross ties and timber and antiseptic liquids will be obtained from organophosphorus agents (sarin, soman, V gases).

But the most important thing, set out perhaps for the first time on such a scale in the program, is its social orientation. Some 13-15 percent of all the sums will be spent on infrastructure development, housing construction, health services, and social benefits for the residents of the places where it is proposed to site the chemical agent destruction facilities.

For example, at stage one, in Kambarka, it is planned to put an inverted siphon through the pond, construct purification installations, a water main from the city center to the military quarters, and reservoirs to supply the residents of the lower, fenced-off part of the city with water. A road will be built to Chaykovskiy and housing, a boilerhouse, and an electricity substation will be constructed... This is scheduled to cost R385 million.

Provision of social amenities will begin well before the processing facilities are constructed and it will be a priority task. The program coordinators reckon that the population will derive real benefit from this process and will be the convention committee's allies, actively cooperating with it.

In juridical terms, stage one of the destruction of the chemical agents begins on 1 April 1993. It is then that the ecological evaluation begins, along with the feasibility study of projects, manufacture and testing of pilot facilities, refinement of them, testing of technology, and training of specialists. The plants will not start up until 30 June 1997.

They have to be ecologically safe and highly efficient in economic terms. It will mark the start of the return of Russian money squandered on the ruinous and senseless arms race.

Chemical Weapons Destruction Sites Discussed

PM2909133992 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 24 Sep 92 p 3

[Report by correspondent Aleksandr Dolgikh: "Chemical Weapons Must Be Destroyed. But Where? Perhaps Where They Were Being Produced Not So Long Ago?"]

[Text] Our correspondent visited the "Khimprom" production association in Novocheboksarsk.

Some preliminary information. Our Armed Forces have at present about 40,000 tonnes of toxic chemical agents in their arsenal. The Americans have approximately the same amount. Since 1987 production of these agents has stopped completely here (in the United States it stopped even earlier). On 23 September 1989 the USSR and United States presidents signed the "Memorandum on an Understanding Between the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America Regarding a Bilateral Experiment to Monitor and Exchange Information in Connection with Banning Chemical Weapons," by which the sides undertook to give each other information about their facilities for producing chemical agents, their precise geographical location, the types of agents produced, and the munitions that had been prepared at particular enterprises.

In Geneva at the end of August the final meeting took place of experts who discussed the final version of the international Convention on Banning the Development, Production, Stockpiling, and Use of Chemical Weapons and their Destruction. It is very likely that it will come into force at the beginning of next year. Then, however, Russia, like other countries that possess these weapons, should destroy them within a 10-year period.

Novocheboksarsk is one of those cities that we are accustomed to calling factory cities. The first inhabitant registered here in 1961, and now there are about 130,000 inhabitants. It is difficult to say what was in the heads of the founders of the "Khimprom" production association, but, to all appearances, they did not from the very start envisage producing here toxic chemical agents. Paints, lacquers, dyes for the leather and textile industries, household chemicals—that is the basic list of output that is being produced even now. But at the beginning of the 1970's the so-called "production facility No. 3" was nevertheless created here, where since December 1972 one of the most potent organophosphoric toxic chemical agents—VX—has been manufactured, a fatal dose of which is only 0.4 milligrams. But only individual people knew about this production facility. Even among the republic's leadership only two or three people were privy to it.

Apart from the protection offered purely by its secret status, production was reliably concealed by technical means. The monitoring which the third Main Administration of the Ministry of Health carried out did not once record the presence of anything like VX in the soil, air, or water. Although, of course, during 15 years' continuous work incidents were impossible to avoid. For example, in 1974 there was a fire in the finished products store-room. Firemen succeeded in putting it out quickly, but one or two of them were nevertheless "poisoned" slightly, which caused their "systems to be upset for a short time." There were also several unpleasant incidents connected with disturbances to the manufacturing cycle. But the documents testify that none of this had any serious consequences.

I repeat that production of toxic chemical agents was stopped as of 1987. Some 2,500 people, who until then had been working at "production facility No. 3," found themselves out of work at that point. It should be pointed out that these specialists were of a high class: Discipline, organization, and professionalism were the main criteria by which they were selected. The majority of them were assigned to other sections of "Khimprom," and some remained at "production facility No. 3." The point is that before basic production at "production facility No. 3" was halted, a few products were produced for the national economy: different kinds of plasticizers, kompleksony [meaning unknown, possibly chelates], and antioxidants. Incidentally, as concerns the antioxidants (agent used in tire production which prevents rubber from aging), they are not produced anywhere else in Russia apart from at Novocheboksarsk.

However, none of this goes any way at all to compensate the plant for expenses it is bearing owing to its equipment being at a standstill and having to maintain it in an appropriate state. This year alone they will amount to more than 135 million rubles [R]. Therefore, during the Russian president's recent visit to "Khimprom," those working at the plant asked him to resolve the question of "production No. 3" as quickly as possible.

The aforementioned draft convention enshrines the idea of using chemical weapons production facilities for these weapons' destruction. Therefore, it is highly likely that this is what the Novocheboksarsk workers will have to do in the near future. The Russian Federation president's Committee for Problems of Chemical and Biological Weapons Conventions is scrutinizing this option, and the "Khimprom" production association is in principle ready for this. It is estimated that the overall cost of this program to destroy toxic chemical agents will amount to about R3.5 billion at 1991 prices.

"Only this program," the association's deputy general director A. Shkuro said to me, "should be elaborated in a very open manner, and should be accompanied by authoritative expert examinations, right down to international ones, when it is being put into effect. Otherwise you will get what happened in Chapayevsk, when the city's inhabitants were confronted with the fact that a

plant to destroy toxic chemical agents had been opened. Indeed, an expert examination confirmed that this plant was ecologically safe, but what was the sense in concealing what the people would sooner or later find out anyway?! The result was as follows: The plant, which is designed to destroy up to 350 tonnes of toxic chemical agents annually, has been standing idle for three years now."

Such questions as the siting of particularly dangerous plants should without doubt be resolved taking stock of the opinions of the people living there. On 12 June B. Yeltsin signed the Decree "On Immediate Measures for Preparing To Carry Out Russia's International Obligations in the Area of Destroying Chemical Weapons Stockpiles," which stipulates the creation of benefits for those who will be engaged in destroying toxic chemical agents, the construction of social facilities and diagnostic centers in a 15 kilometer zone, and mandatory state insurance.

If we are to talk about the technology for destroying toxic chemical agents, it has already been produced in Russia, and has been approved by an international commission of experts. In short it amounts to the following. Shells, bombs, missile warheads, etc., which contain toxic chemical agents are first of all drilled through. Then the toxic agent is "sucked up" through the hole, and immediately detoxified. Materials that have undergone reactions are recycled or burned. This is as far as organophosphorus toxic agents (sarin, zoman [translation unknown], and VX) are concerned. There is every indication that Lewisite will through processing be used as a raw material for producing pure arsenic (which is used in radioelectronics).

That is how it is planned to destroy chemical weapons in our country. However, it is, nevertheless, unclear where this is going to take place. The final decision depends on many factors. First and foremost on those people who live in Novocheboksarsk, Volgograd, Chapayevsk, Berezniki, and other cities where this terrible weapon was produced just recently, and where there are the conditions for its destruction.

ASIAN SECURITY ISSUES

Central Asian, Mideast States To Confer on Security

92P50139A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 18 Sep 92 p 3

[NEGA item under the rubric "Events, Meetings, Visits: Promptly After the Fact"]

[Text] Kazakhstan—In October and November, there will be a meeting in Alma-Ata of the leaders of Turkmenia, Kazakhstan, Turkey, Iran, Uzbekistan, Pakistan, and Kyrgyzstan. It is proposed to consider the idea of creating a new collective security system in Asia. It is planned to base the concept of a Conference on Mutual

Action and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia on the principles of work of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe [CSCE] and to use the structure of the latter organization in creating the former's own mechanism. In the opinion of the initiators of the new meeting, the Asian collective security system should not have an exclusive character, so as to make it possible for other states in the region to join, in particular, Russia, China, India, and Mongolia.

Moscow Completes Troop Withdrawal From Mongolia

Foreign Ministry Announcement

LD2509133692 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service
in Russian 1257 GMT 25 Sep 92

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent]

[Text] Moscow, 25 Sep—As officially reported today by Russia's Foreign Ministry, in line with accords that were reached earlier, the withdrawal of Russian troops from Mongolia was completed in full in September. Talks are being held on matters concerning military townlets that have been left on Mongolia's territory, objects of the training and material base, and other problems.

China Welcomes Pullout

LD2809082292 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
0727 GMT 28 Sep 92

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Pavel Spirin]

[Text] Beijing September 28 TASS—China welcomes the completion of the Russian troop withdrawal from Mongolia announced by the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, a Chinese foreign political department spokesman said today in an interview with ITAR-TASS. The report on the withdrawal, which was carried out in September in accordance with agreements reached earlier, was circulated on Sunday [27 September].

Spokesman Comments

OW3009013992 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1548 GMT 29 Sep 92

[Report by diplomatic correspondents Andrey Borodin, Igor Porshnev, and others; from "Diplomatic Panorama"—following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Excerpt] Russia has completed the withdrawal of its forces from Mongolia, according to a briefing given in Moscow on 29 September by Sergey Yastrzhembskiy, the director of the Department of Information of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. He said that negotiations were now being conducted regarding the fate of military installations and property left behind in Mongolia. [passage omitted]

REPUBLIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS ISSUES

Ukraine Said Backtracking on Denuclearization Pledge

PM2909085392 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 25 Sep 92 p 3

[Report by Gennadiy Kostin: "Where Certain Senior
Figures Are Taking Ukraine"]

[Text] The 1 June 1968 nuclear nonproliferation treaty is
a highly important international document. In accordance
with this treaty any increase in the number of
states with nuclear weapons is seen as, to put it mildly,
an extremely undesirable and simply inadmissible factor
undermining stability in the world.

In accordance with this obvious logic the states that were
previously part of the USSR reached the decision that
only Russia is to retain the right to have the former
Soviet Union's nuclear weapons. Thus they are not
allowing the 1968 treaty to be undermined.

Today all tactical nuclear weapons have already been
concentrated on Russian territory. The Russian Defense
Ministry and Russian industry have been made responsible
for the maintenance and storage of and necessary
cuts in this arsenal.

The strategic nuclear weapons situation is more complex.
They are still sited on the territory of four states—
Russia, Kazakhstan, Belarus, and Ukraine. It is not that
easy to redeploy strategic nuclear arms, and they include
not only nuclear warheads, but also delivery vehicles.
Ground-launched strategic nuclear missiles involve a
ramified infrastructure—launch silos, command posts,
technical servicing bases, and so on. There is a similar
situation with regard to strategic heavy bombers limited
by the START Treaty signed in Moscow last summer.

In view of these circumstances the CIS countries concluded
30 December 1991 the Minsk Strategic Forces Agreement,
which envisages the procedure and timetable for the
disassembly [razukomplektovaniye] of these weapons,
including those now in Ukraine, by the end of 1994.
And the Lisbon protocol of 23 May 1992 signed by the
four CIS countries (on whose territory the former
USSR's strategic nuclear weapons are sited) and the
United States confirms the nuclear-free status of Belarus,
Kazakhstan, and Ukraine and underlines these three
states' commitments to officially subscribe to the nuclear
nonproliferation treaty within the "shortest possible
period" in line with their constitutional practice.

It is quite obvious that these states should juridically
accede to the nonproliferation treaty before the START
Treaty comes into force. Without this its ratification
cannot effectively be considered complete. But none of
the aforementioned states has to date formalized its
nuclear-free status. What is more, the West is starting to
become seriously alarmed by Ukraine's intentions.

What am I referring to? According to REUTER, V.
Tolubko and Yu. Kostenko, members of the Ukrainian
Supreme Soviet Committee for Defense Questions who
were recently in Washington, said that "Ukraine will not
necessarily comply with the dates and commitments
enshrined in the Lisbon protocol." According to the
agency, that approach from Ukraine may herald serious
problems for the START Treaty.

These Ukrainian parliamentarians claimed that Ukraine
may not hand over to Russia for destruction the strategic
missiles there. When the U.S. State Department's official
spokesman was asked to comment on this statement, he
replied; "In my opinion, the crux of the matter is that we
all agreed with the START Treaty and other accords
surrounding it. We consider them important and we
must all stick to them."

It is amazing that there are senior officials in Ukraine
who want to condemn their own country to a "status of
disrespect" in the world community, not to mention
possible economic and political isolation of the country
such as perhaps only Iraq has experienced today.

Kazakh President Views Ukrainian Nuclear Policy

PM2909080092 Paris LE MONDE in French
27-28 Sep 92 pp 1,3

[Interview with President Nursultan Nazarbayev by
Sylvie Kauffmann in France; date not given]

[Excerpt] [Kauffmann] The postponement of the CIS
summit scheduled to take place in Bishkek on 25 September
highlighted the problems connected with the
integration of the former republics of the USSR, especially
because of the disagreements among the nuclear
states on the status of strategic armaments. What do you
intend to do with your nuclear weapons?

[Nazarbayev] This summit has been postponed until 9
October because the main proposals I had submitted—
for a banking union and the creation of an economic
coordination council—had not been given sufficient
preparation. In regards to nuclear weapons, our position
has not changed: We have created unified armed forces
and Kazakhstan has placed its strategic arms under
unified command (of the CIS—LE MONDE editor's
note).

[Kauffmann] However, Ukraine, which is demanding
the "administrative" control of nuclear weapons on its
territory, has a different position?

[Nazarbayev] That is Ukraine's problem.

[Kauffmann] However, it is also the CIS' problem, and
hence yours....

[Nazarbayev] Questions likely to change the content of
the Alma-Ata agreement (which formed the CIS—LE
MONDE editor's note) must be settled by all the signa-
tories. Having said that, the problems worrying the
international community do not come from Kazakhstan;

Kazakhstan advocates arms reduction and has signed all the agreements aimed at that. Kazakhstan became a nuclear state against its will, nobody asked our view.... We now want to become a nuclear-free state. So, in a period of seven years, we will reduce strategic arms, in accordance with the START agreements. We have also signed a collective defense agreement with Russia, under the terms of which the parties themselves decide where they will deploy their arms and on what territory. Belarus has decided to transfer its nuclear forces to Russian jurisdiction, that is its right. If Ukraine—and I respect the processes which led it to that, it is not a simple matter—decides to take control of all the nuclear weapons on its territory, it must declare whether or not it is a nuclear power. As far as I know, Ukraine has signed the Washington agreement, it has signed the Lisbon agreement...which make provision for turning it into a nuclear-free country. Now, if the international community wishes to know Ukraine's intentions, it must ask Ukraine! Kazakhstan remains a member of the unified armed forces, it seems to me that that is clear. [passage omitted]

Ukraine Reaffirms Denuclearization Commitment

Presidential Spokesman

*OW2809234492 Moscow INTERFAX in English
2107 GMT 28 Sep 92*

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] The Ukrainian presidential spokesman, Vladimir Shlyaposhnikov, has said that neither Leonid Kravchuk, nor other republican leaders have made official statements hinting it may reconsider its intention to eventually become free of nuclear weapons. This course is unchanged, and this means that Ukraine will stick to its nuclear disarmament commitments, Vladimir Shlyaposhnikov told journalists in Kiev.

In turn, the Ukrainian Defence Ministry press service has confirmed that "the republic's nuclear policy remains the same". The press service issued a statement saying that strategic weapons would be withdrawn from Ukraine and scrapped within seven years, which fully agrees with the international agreements to which Ukraine is a signatory".

Defense Ministry Statement

*LD2809203192 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
1934 GMT 28 Sep 92*

[By UKRINFORM-TASS correspondent Nikolay Zayka]

[Text] Kiev September 28 TASS—"The position of Ukraine regarding its aspiration to become a nuclear-free state remains unchangeable. The strategic nuclear weapons will be removed from the Ukrainian territory and destroyed within seven years, which fully corresponds to international agreements and Ukraine's commitments," according to a statement released here by the press service of the Ukrainian Defense Ministry.

Until the last rocket is destroyed, Ukraine, whose armed forces are not included in the composition of the Commonwealth Unified Armed Forces, will retain its membership in the Command of Commonwealth Strategic Forces to which all strategic forces stationed on the Ukrainian territory are subordinated. The Ukrainian Defense Ministry exercises an administrative control over all strategic forces located on the Ukrainian territory, which is a reliable guarantee of their non-use.

This statement of the Ukrainian Defense Ministry denies reports that appeared in some news media saying Nursultan Nazarbayev, president of Kazakhstan, allegedly condemned "statements by Ukrainian leaders" on maintaining status of a nuclear power.

REGIONAL AFFAIRS

CSCE Security Cooperation Forum Opens in Vienna

AU2309094392 Vienna DIE PRESSE
in German 23 Sep 92 p 3

[Burkhard Bischof report: "Fasslabend Warns Against Security Egotism"]

[Text] Vienna—On Tuesday [22 September] the newly established CSCE forum for security cooperation was opened in Vienna's Hofburg Palace with a speech by Austrian Defense Minister Werner Fasslabend. Fasslabend said that it is one of "the most urgent tasks of the forum to integrate the new member states in a security system, which comprises the entire CSCE region, and to thus prevent a revival of the security egotism of national states from the outset."

However, a number of the new CSCE members did not send any delegations to Vienna. The republics of Central Asia and of Trans-Caucasus, as well as Bosnia-Herzegovina are not represented. Japan, which has had a "qualified observer status" in the CSCE since the Helsinki summit, was not permitted to take the floor at yesterday's opening session because of French objections. The French argued approximately as follows: If Japan participates in the CSCE forum, the Mediterranean states should do so, too. However, participation by Libya, for instance, is out of the question for important Western states.

Excitement among the CSCE diplomats was caused yesterday by the proposal made by Hungarian delegation head Istvan Gyarmati to negotiate, within the framework of the Vienna security talks, a disarmament treaty like the agreement on conventional armed forces in Europe with all successor states of the former Yugoslavia. This would cause problems just because the FRY (Serbia and Montenegro) is currently excluded from participating in CSCE meetings. "One would have to take great care," a high-ranking Western diplomat said in a reaction to Gyarmati's proposal, "that the FRY is not let into the CSCE again through the back door."

It is interesting to note that Western states are striving to create a system of global exchange of information in the area of security within the framework of the Vienna forum—an exchange which is also supposed to include information about warships, tonnages, and submarines. In practice, this would mean that a U.S. taboo would start to crumble: So far, the Americans have categorically ruled out the inclusion of naval forces in multilateral arms control talks.

Germany Calls For CSCE Behavior Code

AU2509103892 Vienna DIE PRESSE in German
25 Sep 92 p 3

["b.b" report: "Germany Urges Code of Behavior in Security Issues"]

[Text] Vienna—At the CSCE Security Cooperation Forum, which was opened in Vienna's Hofburg Palace this week, Germany wants to massively urge the 52 participating states to agree on a code of behavior for security policy. This was announced by Ambassador Guenter Joetze, the head of the German delegation to the CSCE forum, at a news conference on Thursday [24 September].

Germany thinks that this code should contain the following issues, among others: a general ban on violence; nonrecognition of territorial gains achieved by force; a ban on support for irregular troops and guerrillas; restraint of the states as regards arms exports; establishment of a responsible authority for arms export control in each participating state; non-first use of weapons; the stationing of troops outside one's own national borders requiring the express agreement of the affected state.

FRANCE

Weapons Programs, Modernization Plans Detailed

PM2209103692 Paris LE MONDE in French
17 Sep 92 p 14

[Unattributed report: "France Makes Provision For Modernizing Albion Plateau With Missiles From Nuclear Submarines"]

[Text] France is studying the modernization of its strategic nuclear missile site in Haute Provence (with new surface-to-surface missiles called S-5 missiles) and it plans to limit the number of its M-5 strategic missile-launching nuclear submarines to four (instead of the current five). These two details were revealed in the special edition of the monthly ARMEES D'AUJOURD'HUI which is prefaced by Defense Minister Pierre Joxe who will introduce the international colloquium on security due to be held in Paris at the end of September and which will be closed by a speech by the head of state.

In this special edition, ARMEES D'AUJOURD'HUI discusses at length the military programming pledges and supplies some additional details to previous information issued by the defense ministry.

This is true, in particular, of the development of nuclear weapon systems. Thus the main "component" of the national strategic force will comprise four Le Triomphant class submarines instead of the five L'Inflexible class submarines currently in service. In 1995, the first in the series of these new strategic submarines will be operational with M-45 sea-to-surface missiles. In the year 2005, the new M-5 missile which will equip the four new generation submarines in turn and which will carry—over longer distances—nuclear warheads which are "toughened" (in other words resistant) to counter-measures, will appear.

Secretary of State for Defense Jacques Mellick said that a decision has been made to study the modernization of the surface-to-surface missiles on the Albion Plateau. The silos on this site currently contain S-3D missiles and, last year, the government stopped the development of the S-45 missile which was due to replace them. The plan being studied aims to design a surface-to-surface version derived from the navy's M-5 sea-to-surface missiles and ready for the year 2005.

Finally, there are plans to continue the studies on an air-launched nuclear missile which will replace the medium-range air-to-surface missile now carried by the air force's Mirage-IV and Mirage-2000-N planes and by the navy's Super-Etendard planes. Mr. Mellick admits that this is "in the more distant future."

In addition, ARMEES D'AUJOURD'HUI confirms that the Franco-German army corps, which will be set up in 1995, will take part in the common defense of the allies, both within the Western European Union and alongside NATO. Armed Forces Chief of Staff Admiral Jacques Lanxade was specific on this point: "It is clear that the implementation of major arms programs, and the settlement of major crises will now no longer be within the scope of a single European nation." ARMEES D'AUJOURD'HUI goes so far as to predict that between the French army (which will be reduced in size) and its different allies there will be "a multinational division of tasks, while maintaining a minimum threshold of individual capabilities and a high level of interoperability both at command level by the use of common procedures and in terms of equipment or support."

In 1997, the French armed forces should number 480,000 men (instead of 540,000 in 1991), with the army alone reduced to 225,000 men (instead of 280,000).

Navy Chief of Staff Admiral Alain Coatanea, expressed concerns about his branch of the armed forces, excluding the strategic nuclear submarines, aircraft carriers, and some surface ships. "Despite current or planned programs," he writes, "the number of warships will fall by 11 percent in the next eight years and their average age will increase from 14 to more than 17 years. Three fourths of our ships will then have exceeded their half-life, instead of half of them now." The navy chief of staff said that the potential will be "inadequate" for the big squadron and transport ships and will be "severely reduced" as regards attack submarines and maritime patrol planes.

Finally, for the first time, Air Force Chief of Staff General Vincent Lanata explained how the Rafale fighter planes which he hopes to be able to order will be shared out. "At present," he explained, "the air force plans to acquire around 235 Rafale planes consisting of 95 single-seater planes and 140 twin-seater planes." This

division corresponds to the pilots' wish—following the 1991 Gulf conflict—to have twin-seaters for tactical missions, which are more difficult, and single-seaters for air defense missions which are regarded as simpler.

GERMANY

Russia Offered Help in Destroying Chemical Weapons

LD2409190492 Hamburg DPA in German 1835 GMT 24 Sep 92

[Text] New York (DPA)—Bonn wants to help Moscow in the destruction of Russian stocks of chemical weapons. Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel made this offer to his Russian counterpart, Andrey Kozyrev, during talks today [24 September] on the fringes of the UN General Assembly. The Russian Government intends to sign the convention on the removal of these weapons of mass destruction, which has already been finalized.

Kinkel appealed to the Russian Government to make things clear as quickly as possible on the future of the Volga Germans.

During a meeting with [Israeli] Foreign Minister Shim'on Peres, a specific date for Kinkel's planned visit to Israel was agreed. The visit is to take place from 18-19 November.

Kinkel said he had received support both from his Russian counterpart and from Chilean Foreign Minister Enrique Silva Cimma for Bonn's long term desire to become a permanent member of the UN Security Council.

Following his four days of talks in New York, Kinkel intends to fly home this evening one day earlier than planned, to take part in tomorrow's debate on Europe in the Bundestag.

'More Than Half' of Soviet Forces Withdrawn

LD2909183692 Hamburg DPA in German 1026 GMT 29 Sep 92

[Excerpt] Berlin (DPA)—More than half of the former Western Group of Soviet Forces in Germany have already withdrawn. The remaining 250,000 soldiers and civilians will follow by the end of 1994, as laid down in the treaty. This was reported by Major General Hartmut Foertsch, head of the German liaison office, on the evening of 28 September in the Club of Berlin Economic Journalists.


Political asylum has been sought by 250 soldiers and civilian workers. The number of deserters is probably not much higher, most of them want to return home and try to make a living there. [passage omitted]

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